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 A serious influenza pandemic could be devastating for the world.  Ideally, such a 
pandemic could be contained, but this may be infeasible.  One promising method for 
pandemic mitigation is to treat infectious individuals with antiviral pharmaceuticals.  
While most of the benefits from treatment accrue to the country in which treatment 
occurs, there are some positive spillovers: when one country treats more of its population 
this both reduces the attack rate in the other country and increases the marginal benefit 
from additional treatment in the other country.  These externalities and complementarities 
may mean that self-interested rich countries should optimally pay for some AV treatment 
in poor countries. 
 This dissertation demonstrates the presence of antiviral treatment externalities in 
simple epidemiological SIR models, and then in a descriptively realistic Global 
Epidemiological Model (GEM).  This GEM simulates pandemic spread between cities 
through the international airline network, and between cities and rural areas through 
ground transport.   
 Under the base case assumptions of moderate transmissibility of the flu, the 
distribution of antiviral stockpiles from rich countries to poor and lower middle income 
countries may indeed pay for itself: providing a stockpile equal to 1% of the population 
of poor countries will reduce cases in rich countries after 1 year by about 6.13 million 
cases at a cost of 4.62 doses per rich-country case avoided.  Concentrating doses on the 
outbreak country is, however, even more cost-effective: in the base case it reduces the 
number of influenza cases by 4.76 million cases, at the cost of roughly 1.92 doses per 
case avoided. These results depend on the transmissibility of the flu strain, the efficacy 
of antivirals in reducing infection and on the proportion of infectious who can 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the 20
th
 century the world experienced three influenza pandemics (1918, 1957 
and 1968), which had significant economic costs and caused millions of illnesses and 
deaths.  The 1918 pandemic killed an estimated 3% of the world’s population, despite 
being slow to spread between countries in an age before air travel. With today’s global 
transportation network, an outbreak of influenza could quickly reach pandemic 
proportions.  There have been concerns since the 1990s about the potential for an H5N1 
"avian flu" strain mutating into a form that can be transmitted between humans.  The 
2009 H1N1 "swine flu" pandemic and the SARS outbreak of 2003 remind us of the 
continued risks to the world should a pandemic occur.  They also remind us that there is 
relatively little cooperation and coordination between countries, and that wealthy nations 
prioritize stockpiling doses of vaccines or antivirals for their own citizens before 
considering treatment in other countries.   
Whether such an inwardly focused policy is optimal depends on the nature and 
magnitude of externalities in treating pandemic flu.  How much do policies to slow the 
spread of the flu in one county reduce attack rates in other countries?  Does treatment of 
infected persons in one country increase the marginal benefits of treatment policies in 
other countries (i.e., are there treatment complementarities?).  The overarching goal of 
this dissertation is to answer both questions in a realistic model of the spread of influenza 
through the global air transport network.   
Simulating the impact of control strategies in a global epidemiological model 
allows examination of two questions regarding international cooperation to mitigate a 
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pandemic:  (1) Is it cost-effective for wealthy nations to pay for the purchase and 
distribution of antivirals in poor countries to slow the spread of the pandemic?  (2) What 
global allocation rules are most effective in reducing attack rates?  In the case where 
treatment with antiviral drugs alone can contain a potential pandemic, there is an obvious 
case for wealthy nations to pay for pandemic containment.  But what about the case 
where a pandemic cannot be detected early enough or treatment is not effective enough 
for containment to be possible?  Pandemic epidemiology involves two types of 
externalities that suggest that it might be in the self-interest of wealthy countries to fund 
such a scheme.  The treatment policy in one country will affect the rate at which the 
pandemic spreads to other countries, so treatment provides a positive externality.  At the 
same time, the increasing marginal effectiveness of treating more people can lead to 
complementarities across countries.   The question is: how large are these effects? 
To investigate these issues this dissertation uses a detailed Global 
Epidemiological Model to simulate influenza pandemics under a range of conditions and 
antivirus treatment policies.  The model divides the world into 106 regions and models 
travel among 288 cities and 101 rural areas in these regions.  The flu spreads from one 
city to another via air travel, and from cities to a rural area in each region via land travel.  
Within each city or rural area the flu spreads via a model in which people transition from 
susceptible to exposed to infectious to recovered or dead. The model distinguishes among 
age groups and uses age-specific contact rates to model the spread of the flu. The 
probability of infection given contact in a particular region varies with latitude (it 
decreases as one moves away from the equator) and season (it is higher during the winter 
than during the summer).   
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With or without control policies, the number of people infected in each region 
depends on when the flu begins (influenza that peaks in Northern Hemisphere winter 
infects more people) and on the infectiousness of the flu (i.e., the reproductive rate R0, 
which measures the number of people an infectious person would infect in an otherwise 
totally susceptible population). 
Ideally, a serious influenza outbreak could be contained and a pandemic 
prevented, but the difficulty in detecting a potential pandemic-strain before it spreads 
widely means that containment is generally infeasible.  However, control policies can 
reduce number of people infected by a pandemic; this dissertation considers the effects of 
administering antiviral (AV) pharmaceuticals to symptomatic infectious individuals.  It is 
not feasible to calculate optimal AV policies, but it is possible to consider a set of 
plausible AV scenarios. 
In the absence of international cooperation it is assumed that antiviral stockpiles, 
as a percent of population, vary with per capita income.  Poor countries are assumed to 
have no stockpiles.  Compare two rules for rich countries distributing stockpiles in poor 
countries: one under which each country receives a fixed number of doses (in proportion 
to population) and another under which antivirals are allocated to the country in which 
the flu begins, which is assumed to be a poor country.  The success of a control strategy 
is measured in terms of its impact on the attack rate (percent of the population infected) at 
the end of a year.  Does it (collectively) pay rich countries to make a donation in terms of 
the impact it has on their own attack rate? 
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The benefits from collective action in the form of influenza treatment depend on 
the size of treatment externalities.  Treatment externalities are large if a pandemic can be 
contained in the source country (Ferguson, et al., 2005; Longini, et al., 2005).  In the 
more likely case in which the pandemic will spread through air travel the externalities 
associated with anti-viral treatment are smaller: treating infectious people in one’s own 
country reduces the domestic attack rate, but has a proportionately much smaller impact 
on other countries.  The question is whether the cost of purchasing and distributing 
antivirals to other countries pays for itself in terms of reducing a country’s own attack 
rate.  
It is always in the interest of wealthy countries to purchase and distribute antivirus 
doses in the outbreak country when doing so can contain a pandemic.  In other cases, the 
marginal private benefits from using limited antivirus supplies to treat domestic patients 
exceed the marginal benefits from donating those doses abroad.  But, if wealthy countries 
retain a stockpile of antiviral drugs sufficient to treat their own cases, then they can 
increase their welfare by paying for purchase and distribution of additional doses to the 
outbreak source country. 
The benefits to rich countries of paying for antivirals in poor countries under 
"midrange" assumptions of influenza transmissibility cover the costs:  donation of 
antivirus to the outbreak source country reduces the number of influenza cases in rich 
countries after 1 year by 4.76 million cases, at the cost of roughly 1.92 doses per case 
avoided.  This donation policy is welfare-enhancing for wealthy countries even at a zero 
percent case fatality rate; at any positive fatality rate the policy is even more valuable. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 briefly reviews the literature 
on policies to control pandemic flu.  Chapter 3 discusses the dynamics of pandemic 
influenza in simple one-city and two-city S-I-R models.  These models are used to 
illustrate the nature of externalities and complementarities present in treating influenza 
epidemics through antivirals, and to contrast the Nash equilibrium in treatment strategies 
with the socially optimum treatment strategy. Chapter 4 presents the Global 
Epidemiological Model, and describes the behavior of the model in a baseline scenario 
with no policy interventions.  Chapter 5 presents the results of simulating pandemic flu 




Chapter 2 Literature on pandemic 
influenza 
 To put this research into context, it is useful to consider three avenues of research 
in the existing literature: 1) the health literature on optimal vaccination policy for 
epidemic diseases, 2) a set of spatially detailed epidemiological models that model 
influenza spread within a city or country, and 3) a set of less detailed but global models 
that track the spread of the flu through the international airline network. 
 The literature on optimal vaccination policy considers the externality effects of 
vaccination policies, either domestically or internationally.  Vaccination provides 
significant benefits for an individual who is vaccinated, but also large external benefits to 
others in the same region; sufficiently high levels of vaccination lead to a "herd 
immunity" effect, where the reproductive rate of the disease is reduced to the point where 
epidemics can be prevented. 
 Francis (2004) considers optimal use of vaccines to control an influenza epidemic 
using a single region SIR model.  The model assumes that a perfectly effective vaccine 
exists at the beginning of the epidemic, and demonstrates that there can be a significant 
positive externality from vaccination.  The model assumes a decentralized setting, where 
agents optimally choose to vaccinate or not in each period as a function of the current 
model state variables.  There is thus there is an insufficient level of vaccination in a 
private market relative to the socially optimal vaccination level.  Francis develops a 
system of optimal vaccine subsidies (or taxes for avoiding vaccination) that internalize 
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this externality, and so induce agents to purchase an efficient level of vaccine; the 
optimal subsidy pays less than 100% of the price of vaccination. 
 Boulier et al. (2007) also consider vaccine use in a single region SIR model, 
focusing on the magnitude of the externalities in vaccine use.  They consider a setting 
where a vaccine exists at the start of an epidemic, but is not 100% effective.  They 
demonstrate that the marginal value to society from vaccination is positive and increases 
with more people vaccinated as long as the effective reproductive rate of the epidemic is 
greater than 1, and declines thereafter.  They estimate the average value of vaccination 
for influenza, and find that the size of the externality from vaccination can be greater than 
1 case reduced per person vaccinated.   
 Barrett (2003) considers international vaccination externalities for disease 
eradiation of endemic diseases (as opposed to epidemic diseases).  Such a disease can be 
eradicated if a sufficiently large proportion of people are vaccinated, but this vaccination 
must occur in every country, and thus eradication is a "weakest link" game.  Barrett 
shows that eradication will often not be the Nash equilibrium of this game, because poor 
countries may derive a lower local benefit from vaccination relative to vaccination costs, 
and because the herd immunity effect means that the benefits from vaccination to the last 
countries to vaccinate will be low, since vaccination elsewhere will have dramatically 
reduced the global disease prevalence.  A cooperative international regime with 
enforcement mechanisms may be needed to achieve the eradication outcome. 
 Spatially detailed models of avian flu transmission at the country level have been 
used to compare a wide set of policy interventions.  These models are able to use a much 
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greater level of detail and structure in metapopulations, and so are effective in analyzing 
policy interventions aimed at containing an influenza outbreak, such as ring quarantines 
or prophylaxis, or contact tracing strategies that use vaccination or antiviral strategies to 
target those likely to be contacted by infectious individuals.  However, these models 
cannot capture the international dimensions of pandemic control policies. 
 Ferguson et al. 2005 use a spatially explicit model of the 85 million people living 
in Thailand and a 100km radius of neighboring contiguous countries.  The model tracks 
influenza spread through households, workplaces, schools and random community 
contact.  They consider targeted prophylactic use of antivirus to contain a pandemic.  
They find that purely social targeting (blanket prophylaxis of all household, workplaces 
and schools that have any new infectious case) has a 90% probability of containing a 
pandemic with reproductive rate 1.25, so long as it can be implemented after only 20 
cases have been observed.  They find that ring prophylaxis (targeting everyone within a 
given radius of a new infectious case) with a 5 kilometer radius can contain a pandemic 
with reproductive rate of up to 1.5 at an average cost of 2 million AV courses.  They also 
consider physical distancing measures, where schools and workplaces are closed; these 
measures combined with prophylaxis can contain a pandemic of reproductive rate up to 
1.7 with 90% probability.  However, all policies require early detection of a pandemic 
strain and extremely rapid response. 
 Longini et al. 2005 use a stochastic model to track  influenza spread through a 
structured geographically distributed population of 500,000 people in rural SE Asia to 
examine the effectiveness of antivirus, quarantine and pre-vaccination with a low efficacy 
non-strain-specific vaccine.  They use data from Thailand to model the number of close 
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and casual daily contacts between individuals of various age-groups to build up a contact 
rate matrix.  The model includes a structured social network that maps households, 
household clusters, workplaces, communal mixing and a regional hospital; the network 
structure affects the mixing probabilities, and allows consideration of targeted policy 
interventions.  They find that targeted use of antivirals have a high chance of containing a 
pandemic for reproductive rates of up to 1.4, if implemented within 21 days of the first 
case.  Antivirals can be effective for reproductive rates up to 1.7 if accompanied by pre-
vaccination.   
 Germann et al. 2006 use a stochastic agent-based simulation model to track 
spread of an influenza pandemic through the United States.  They use US Census and 
Department of Transport data to construct a detailed spatial model of the United States, 
with a metapopulation of 281 million people distributed among 65,334 census tracts, each 
organized into 2,000 communities.  The model maps households, household clusters, 
preschools, playgroups, schools, workplaces neighborhoods and communities.  They 
consider a range of policy interventions including targeted prophylaxis, mass vaccination, 
school closure, and quarantine.  To achieve reductions in attack rate down to 10% 
through targeted antivirus use alone, 10 million doses are needed for an influenza strain 
with a reproductive rate of 1.7, and 51 million doses for a reproductive rate of 1.8.  But in 
all cases, this targeted treatment requires rapid and effective targeting, with a knowledge 
of population clusters that may not be available to public health agencies without 
significant upfront investment. 
 A series of global models follow Rvachev and Longini (1985) in using and 
refining an SIR model core to track the progress of an influenza pandemic.  Rvachev and 
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Longini develop a deterministic difference equation model to simulate travel within a 
network of 52 cities, and use this to reproduce the 1968-9 pandemic that started in Hong 
Kong.  They find that the predicted local outbreak peak timing roughly matches that of 
the actual pandemic. 
 Grais et al. (2003) use a global influenza pandemic model with the same 52 cities 
from Rvachev and Longini.  Their model adds seasonal variation in infectiousness; they 
use monthly seasonal scaling factors, one for the northern hemisphere and one for the 
southern hemisphere. They consider the dynamics of a pandemic that starts in Hong 
Kong, and show that the pandemic outbreaks occur concurrently in northern hemisphere 
and southern hemisphere cities despite the seasonal scaling factors.  They show that the 
pandemic reaches northern hemisphere cities an average of 111 days earlier using year 
2000 travel volumes rather than 1968 travel volumes.  Policy interventions are not 
considered. 
 Hufnagel et al. (2004) use a global pandemic model to track a generic pandemic 
disease, and demonstrate the example to model the 2003 SARS outbreak.  They use a 
probabilistic rather than deterministic model, where disease transmission and travel are 
stochastic.  A stochastic model is potentially valuable in considering the early stage of a 
pandemic, where the variation in behavior by a few infected individuals can alter the 
course of the pandemic.  However, they find that probabilistic variation has little impact 
at the global level, and that the pandemic outcomes remain predictable in spite of 
variation in the behavior of those individuals infected early on.  They consider 
quarantine-like restrictions on individuals and travel restrictions on cities.  Isolating only 
2% of individuals can be highly effective in reducing attack rates (from 78.45% to 
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37.50%) but travel restrictions are less effective; it would require shutting down the 
27.5% of the most highly trafficked air connections to achieve a similar effect. 
 Colizza et al. (2007) consider a global influenza pandemic model covering 3,100 
urban areas (but no rural areas).  They consider allocations of antiviral stockpiles across 
countries, but focus on containment rather than mitigation.  Containment is possible in 
their model if outbreak cities have an antivirus stockpile, but this relies on optimistic 
assumptions about antivirus treatment; they assume that 50-70% of new infectious cases 
can be treated, and that treatment occurs immediately, and so antivirals are very effective 
in reducing influenza transmission.  Their conception of global cooperation is one where 
AV doses are shared freely between countries, rather than one where rich countries retain 
most doses for domestic use.  They conclude that pandemic strains with reproductive 
rates up to 1.9 can be controlled with global stockpiles sufficient to treat 2%-6% of the 
world population, and that there is a strong case for cooperative use of AV where rich 
countries share their stockpile with poorer countries, but this is contingent on their 
model's ability to contain the pandemic. 
 Epstein at al. (2007) use an earlier version of the Global Epidemiological Model 
(with 155 cities) used in this dissertation to examine the effect of travel restrictions.  They 
find that travel restrictions alone provide only a small delay in the time it takes for a 
pandemic to arrive in the United States (2-3 weeks for an outbreak starting in Hong 
Kong; no delay for an outbreak starting in London), but note that delays can be longer 
when travel restrictions are combined with other policy measures.  They also note the 
critical effect of seasonality; travel restrictions that delay the pandemic can increase the 
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severity of local outbreaks if the outbreaks are pushed into the high infectiousness season 
(winter). 
 This dissertation draws on the previous literature, but advances it in several 
important ways.  Though the positive externalities from vaccination are high and are well 
understood, the externalities from pandemic mitigation through antiviral use are not well 
understood, particularly in the realistic case where antiviral use alone is incapable of 
containing a pandemic.  This dissertation uses an epidemiological model similar to global 
models in the previous literature, but covers the entire global population of 6.41 billion 
rather than merely those in selected cities.  It adopts an age structure and age-specific 





Chapter 3 Basic Influenza Models 
The main class of epidemiological models used to model the spread of an 
epidemic through a large population are known as ―compartmental‖ models, where at any 
given time the population is divided amongst a set of mutually exclusive categories.  This 
chapter describes the common core to these models, and uses simple one-city and two-
city simulation examples to demonstrate key properties of model dynamics, and the 
potential for positive externalities in this framework. 
i) SIR models 
The simplest compartmental model is known as the SIR model, where each 
member of the population is Susceptible (S), Infectious (I) or has Recovered (R)
1
.  The 
model is ideal for tracking spread of a disease such as a specific pandemic strain of 
influenza, where re-infection is not possible because people who recover develop 
antibodies that protect against the particular strain. 
The SIR model tracks the number of people in each category in each time period, 
such that S(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N (the population size).
2
  Given initial values, the number of 
people in each category changes over time as Susceptible cases are infected by Infectious 
cases, and as Infectious cases Recover.  Assume a very small but positive value of I(0), 
and assume R(0) = 0, so S(0) ≈ N.  The model operates in continuous time as described 
by: 
                                                          
1
 Sometimes this category is referred to as "Removed", since some proportion of infectious cases may die 
rather than recover.  For most of this analysis we assume a zero fatality rate, but adding a small positive 
fatality rate has little impact on model dynamics. 
2
 The model can also be written with S, I and R as proportions of the population, such that they sum to 1. 
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(1) 
      
  
                 
(2) 
      
  
       
(3) 
β represents the probability of transmission conditional on exposure to an infectious 
person, or the average rate of infection per susceptible.
3
  βS(t) represents the rate at which 
an infectious individual infects susceptible persons.  δ is the rate at which an infected 
individual recovers, and so 1/ δ is the average duration of infection.  Disease prevalence 
increases over time (dI(t)/dt > 0) if and only if [β/δ] S(t) > 1.  Simply put, prevalence 
increases only if the number of infections caused by an infectious person during the time 
he is infectious exceeds 1 (i.e., only if he can replace himself).  Thus, a necessary 
condition for an epidemic to begin is for β/δ > 1.   β/δ is also the average number of 
persons infected by an infectious person in an otherwise totally susceptible population 
(i.e., when S(0) = N) and is termed the basic reproductive rate, R0.
4
 
The system of equations does not have a closed form solution, but is known to 
have certain basic properties (Kermack and McKendrick 1927).  It can be shown that: 
                          (4) 
                                                          
3
 This implicitly assumes that the rate at which people contact each other remains constant throughout 
the epidemic; there is no scope for prevalence-elastic behavior, where individuals might take preventative 
actions to reduce exposure if much of the population is infected. 
4
 We denote the reproductive rate at time t as Rt.  R with a subscript will always refer to the reproductive 
rate, not the number of Recovered cases in period t, which we denote R(t) for both continuous and 
discrete time models.  This notation is unfortunate, but mirrors that used in the literature where R is used 





And that in the limit as t→∞ the number of Recovered is described by a transcendental 
equation: 
                            (5) 
where R(∞) is the limiting value of R(t) as t →∞.  With R(0) = 0, S(0) ≈ N and N = 1, (5) 
can be simplified as: 
                     (6) 
R(∞) < N, so the pandemic ends endogenously and the entire population is never 
infected.  The reproductive rate Rt declines over time because there are fewer Susceptible 
cases left in the population, and dI(t)/dt is increasing in S(t).  In practical terms, more of 
the people that a given Infectious person contacts have already Recovered and are 
immune to re-infection, so each successive Infectious case causes fewer new cases.  As 
long as the reproductive rate Rt is greater than one, then the number of infectious cases 
I(t) is increasing.  When Rt drops below one, then I(t) is decreasing, and the epidemic will 
end in the limit as I(t) and dI(t)/dt approach zero. 
A slight variation on the core SIR model is the SEIR model, which adds an 
Exposed category.  Susceptible cases that are contacted by an Infectious case move to an 
Exposed incubation state, where they are infected but not yet Infectious, before 
proceeding to Infectious after a fixed time period, and then on to Recovered.  The model 
performs in much the same way, but is more descriptively realistic and allows us to fit 
observed real-world parameter values more easily.  It is this SEIR model that underlies 
the GEM, but in this chapter I focus on simpler SIR models, which share the same 
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general properties.  The SIR model’s behavior can be difficult to demonstrate 
analytically, so instead I examine a series of simulation models to illustrate key properties 
of this class of models.  This informal and qualitative illustration will inform the 
discussion of the full GEM results. 
ii) One city model baseline 
Consider a discrete time version of the SIR model in a single city of population N.  
The model is described by: 
                       (7) 
                             (8) 
                   (9) 
Assume R(0) = 0, assume I(0) is very small relative to N, and so S(0) = N – I(0) ≈ N.  
Specifying parameter values for β, δ and N and assuming a seed value for I0 the model 
behavior to be observed, either analytically or by running the model using a simulation 
program.  For example, suppose: 
 β = 0.3 (each infectious person infects 0.3 people day when the entire population 
is susceptible) 
 δ = 0.2 (an expected infectious duration of 5 days) 
 Together these imply R0 = 1.5 
 N = 1 (which lets us interpret S, I and R as proportions) 
 I(0) = 0.001 (very small relative to the population size) 




Figure 3.1: One city model, baseline 
 
S, I and R are well-behaved
5
.  The epidemic is effectively over in less than 4 
months, with only 0.01N new infectious cases occurring after day 104.  Much of the 
population remains uninfected at the end of the epidemic: the "attack rate"
6
 (R(t)/N) after 
1 year is 0.584; that is, 58.4% of the population have been infected, while 41.6% remain 
Susceptible.  The peak of the epidemic occurs on day 57, where 6.38% of the population 
is Infectious.  This implies that the reproductive rate on day 57 R75 ≈ 1, and that Rt < 1 
for t > 57.  
 Changing the parameter assumptions changes the observed outcome in an 
intuitive fashion.  For example, suppose β = 0.25 or β = 0.35, giving R0 values of 1.25 or 
1.75, respectively.  Figure 3.2 shows the behavior of I(t) and R(t) under these 
                                                          
5
 S, I and R are not continuous functions of time – in a discrete time model these values are only defined 
at discrete values of t – so we cannot formally talk about behavior of some continuous function S(t).  
Nonetheless, we can observe what behavior is occurring, and what the limiting function as the length of 
each interval →0 would look like, and what properties this limiting function would have.  This limiting 
function would be quasiconcave for S, I and R; increasing for R and decreasing for S. 
6
 Technically the attack rate is( R(∞) – R(0))/N, but since R(0) = 0 is assumed in all cases it is simpler to 



















assumptions.  Model outcomes are highly sensitive to β; higher values of β mean a more 
severe epidemic, with faster onset, higher peak, and higher attack rate. 




















































A key property of the model is how the attack rate changes as R0 declines (see 
Figure 3.3).  Recall that in the example with δ=0.2, R0 approaches 1 as β approaches 0.2.   
Figure 3.3: One city model, Attack rate sensitivity to Beta 
 
When β > δ the attack rate is an increasing function of β and is strictly concave (above a 
threshold)
7
.  This drives a key property of the SIR model: policy measures that reduce R0 
have increasing returns to scale as they drive R0 towards 1 from above.  This means that, 
in general, a policy that reduces R0 from 1.7 to 1.6 will have a smaller impact on the 
gross attack rate than a policy that reduces R0 from 1.4 to 1.3.  This means that policies 
that reduce R0 by a given amount are more effective in countries with lower disease 
transmission rates, due to density, social activity or climate.  Many policies could 
potentially reduce R0: treatment of Infectious cases with antivirus will reduce β and could 
increase δ, vaccinating Susceptible individuals (or providing them with prophylactic 
                                                          
7
 The function is not quite strictly concave when β is close to δ (ie when R0) is close to 1, there is an 





















antivirus) would reduce β, using quarantine or other physical distancing measures to 
reduce contact rates would reduce β. 
iii) One city model with anti-viral treatment 
The SIR model can be used to analyze the impact of policy interventions, such as 
a policy to treat Infectious individuals with antiviral pharmaceuticals
8
 (AV).  This chapter 
considers a model where the policy choice variable is the size of an exhaustible stockpile 
of AV doses, mirroring the AV policy interventions used in the GEM (see Chapter 5).  
This model cannot be solved analytically, but its properties can be demonstrated through 
use of a simple simulation model.  Appendix 1 presents an alternative model (where the 
choice variable is the proportion of population that is treated) where model outcomes can 
be computed directly. 
Assume that there exists a fixed AV stockpile with P* doses, 0 ≤ P* ≤ N, and let 
P(t) be the number of doses consumed by day t (with P(0) = 0).  Also assume that a fixed 
proportion p of new infectious cases are immediately treated with AV, for as long as P(t) 
< P*.  Each case treated reduces the stockpile by one dose, so:  
                           if P(t) < P*               (10) 
           otherwise  
                                                          
8
 The most common antivirals are Zanamivir and Oseltamivir, sold and marketed as Tamiflu.  Treatment 
involves taking a course of one of these drugs, typically one dose a day for 5-10 days.  In this research a 
“dose” is used to refer to sufficient antivirals for a full course of treatment, not just a single capsule. 
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Treatment has the effect of reducing the effective infection rate by modifying the 
infectiveness parameter β.  There is an underlying β
o
 determined by infectiousness and 
contact rates , and then an effective β(t) in any time period.  Assume:
9
 
               if P(t) < P*               (11) 
          otherwise  
where e is the efficacy of the antivirus treatment.  Suppose for example that: 
 βo = 0.3, δ = 0.2, N = 1, I0 = 0.001, as before. 
 P* = 0.2, i.e. the stockpile is sufficient to treat 20% of the entire population 
 p = 0.6, i.e. 60% of newly infectious cases can be treated 
 e  = 0.4, i.e. AV reduces the infectiousness of patients by 40% 




Figure 3.4 shows the model dynamics in this case, where the stockpile is not exhausted. 
  
                                                          
9
 Note that this simple formulation ignores slight discreteness issues that occur in the period in which the 
stockpile is exhausted; total doses distributed will be slightly greater than the stockpile size, but this 
difference will be very small as long as the number of periods is large and the number of new infectious 
cases per period is small relative to P. 
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Figure 3.4: One city model with unexhausted AV stockpile 
 
 
 The attack rate here is much lower than in the case with no AV stockpile (24.1%, 
down from 58.4%), and the duration of the pandemic is longer (there are still new cases 
occurring near the end of the year).  The proportion of people ever treated is 14.4%, 
which is less than the size of the 20% stockpile, and so the excess AV doses are never 
used.  This highlights a key aspect of the choice of AV stockpile size; given any set of 
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cannot usefully deploy a stockpile larger than the number of people it can treat.  But this 
number of treatable cases can be observed only by running the model with AV treatment 
included.  Parameter inputs cannot be easily mapped directly into the implied maximum 
effective stockpile size. 
 Suppose now the same assumptions as used in Fig 3.4, but reduce the AV 
stockpile size from P* = 0.2 down to P* = 0.1.  Figure 3.5 demonstrates the resulting 
dynamics. 
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The model follows an identical path to that of Figure 3.4 until day 151, when the AV 
stockpile is exhausted.  On day 151, β instantly jumps from 0.228 up to the original value 
of 0.3, and so dI(t)/dt rises proportionally.  The attack rate is 50.1%, as compared to 
52.9% with no AV treatment, and 24.1% with an unexhausted stockpile. 
 To understand the behavior, imagine splitting this epidemic with AV treatment 
into two components.  The first component lasts from day 0 to 150, and is equivalent to a 
no-AV model with a β of 0.228.  The second component starts on day 151, and behaves 
identically to a no-AV model with a β of 0.3 but with initial conditions equal to the those 
observed on day 150 of the first component; I(0) = 0.0076, S(0) = 0.8336 and R(0) = 
0.1588.  This means that changing the point where the stockpile is exhausted (by 
changing the stockpile size) in the original combined model is functionally identical to 
changing the initial conditions of this secondary component.  The impact of changing the 
stockpile size can be examined either directly (by running the AV-treatment model with 
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conditions).  This does not allow running only the second part of the model (the full 
model is still needed in order to find the initial conditions for the second part), but it does 
explain how results can be mapped from the special case where we have a stockpile that 
is exhausted into the general case with no antivirus.  Similarly, the case where antivirus 
does not expire is just another version of the general no antivirus model with a lower 
value of β. 
 Figure 3.6 demonstrates the impact of varying the initialization values I(0) or S(0) 
values around the day 150 values of the example above.  Holding constant the pool of 
Susceptibles, the attack rate is increasing in the initial stock of infectious cases.  Holding 
constant the stock of infectious cases, , the attack rate is increasing in size of the pool of 
Susceptibles.
10
   Translating this back to AV stockpile size: increasing the stockpile size 
reduces the attack rate (as long as that larger stockpile is actually consumed), because it is 
equivalent to reducing the size of the stock of infectious cases present when the model 
reaches any value of S. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 This allows us to compare this model with antivirus to a model of vaccination, as in Boulier et al. (2007), 
where vaccination operates by directly removing individuals from the pool of Susceptibles. 
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Figure 3.6: One city model, sensitivity testing of initialization 
 
 
 Looking at the impact of changing the stockpile directly highlights an important 
boundary condition: with any given parameter inputs, there is a maximum stockpile size 
that can be effectively consumed.  Consider the previous one-city example, where β
o
 = 
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P*.  Figure 3.7 demonstrates the effect on the attack rate for various values of stockpile 
size P* (Panel B is a "zoomed" version of Panel A). 
Figure 3.7: One city model, effect of changing stockpile size 
 
 
 Increasing stockpile size reduces attack rate, and does so at an increasing rate, 
until the point is reached where the stockpile is not exhausted during the epidemic. This 
property is robust for any parameter inputs, and is critical in determining optimal 








































depends on R0 (which determine the attack rate), and on p, the proportion of people who 
can be treated.  For example; if a particular set of parameter inputs lead to an attack rate 
of 0.2, then    is 0.2p.  In Figure 3.7,         .   
 The length of an epidemic has implications for the dates at which an analyst may 
want to calculate the attack rate.  A common approach is to examine attack rates after 1 
year, but if the epidemic is slow to spread (from a low R0 value, or a highly efficacious 
AV treatment policy) then it may not end within a year.  Figure 3.8 shows model 
dynamics for P* = 0.10 but with e = 0.45 (as opposed to 0.4 in previous examples), 
slowing the course of the epidemic as long as there is any stockpile left (the stockpile is 
exhausted on day 271).  The day attack rate after 365 days is 31.6%, but the final attack 
rate would clearly be higher if the model continued running past 1 year. 
 Considering only the attack rate on day 365 may be misleading.  This issue 
becomes more important in the full GEM, where the large populations and limited travel 
between airports increase the pandemic duration.  But it may be possible to develop, mass 
produce and distribute a strain-specific vaccine in roughly a year, so a one year window 
may be sufficient for examining the consequences of pandemic mitigation through 
antivirals, after which antiviral treatment would tend to be dominated by vaccine 





Figure 3.8: One city model, epidemic lasting more than 1 year 
 
 
iv) One city model: optimal stockpile size 
 What size of AV stockpile should a city choose to purchase before an epidemic?  
The city prefers to have a lower attack rate - each person who becomes infectious suffers 
a welfare loss from disease symptoms (or death, if case fatality rate is positive) - but the 



























city solves a cost minimization problem, trying to minimize the sum of morbidity costs 
and stockpile/treatment costs: 
              
          (12) 
where R(∞,P*)   is  the total number of cases of the disease determined by the epidemic 
model
11
, where K(.) is the disutility of morbidity (and is increasing in R(.)) and where 
C(.) is the cost of purchasing and disseminating the AV stockpile (and is increasing in 
P*).  For simplicity, suppose that U(.) is linear, so U(.) = VR(∞,P*), where V is the 
welfare loss of an influenza case.  Assume C(.) is linear, so C(P*) = cP*. 
 The concave shape of R(∞,P*) (see figure 3.7 and equation (5)) tends to drive the 
optimal policy towards the boundary cases: dR(∞,P*)/dP* is small in absolute value at 
low values of P*, but is large in absolute value as P* approaches   .  If V is high enough 
relative to c, then the solution is to choose P* =   .  If V is low enough relative to c, then 
the solution is to choose P* = 0.  Figure 3.9 shows the payoff to the city in where β
o
 = 
0.3, δ=0.2, e = 0.4, p = 0.6, for extreme cases [V=100,c=10] and [V=10,c=100] and an 
intermediate case [V=10,c=25]. 
  
                                                          
11
 Since all infectious cases eventually recover and all Recovered cases were once infectious, it is simpler 
to track the value of R than the cumulative total of infectious cases. 
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As expected, when V is high relative to c, the optimal choice is to pick P* =    ≈ 0.145.  
When c is high relative to V, the optimal choice is to pick P* = 0There is no interior 
solution; for any c large enough that utility is increased by choosing some value    
slightly less than   , the planner is better off choosing P* = 0 instead of   .  The fourth 
panel of Figure 3.9 also indicates a potential complication: small changes in parameter 
values can lead to a large change in the optimal value of P*.  This means that best 
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v) Two-city model 
 A one city model is useful for studying the course of an epidemic in a closed 
system, but to observe the interaction of choices across cities or countries a more 
complicated model is needed.  Suppose that the simple model is expanded to encompass 
two cities A and B, linked by a travel connection, each with their own AV stockpile Pi*.  
Both cities are identical, except that the epidemic starts in city A and then spreads to B 
through this travel connection.  Each period, a proportion α of the Infected cases in each 
city travel to the other city, and are replaced by an equal number of Susceptibles moving 
in the opposite direction.   
Figure 3.10: Two city model 
 
Migration       is defined in terms of movement from A to B, but a negative value 
indicates a movement of people from B to A.  Suppressing time subscripts (and using 
superscripts to indicate t+1), in city i : 
                                  (13) 
                                         (14) 
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                      (15) 
           
  if Pi < Pi* 
     
 if Pi ≥ Pi* 
(16) 
                              if Pi < Pi* 
         0 if Pi ≥ Pi* 
(17) 
where i and j subscripts denote cities A and B, where the daily travel rate       
              , where Pi* is the AV stockpile in city i, where Pi is the number of AV 
doses remaining in city i, and where pi is the proportion of people who become infectious 
in city i who receive city i.
12
  Note that βi is now time-varying, whereas βi* is a fixed 
parameter for each city. 
This model lets us examine the effect of changing the AV stockpile size in city i on the 
attack rate in city j.  Assume for this example that: 
 βA = βB = 0.3, p = 0.6, e = 0.4, δ = 0.2 as before 
 α = 0.01 (i.e., 1% of the number of infectious cases travel between cities each 
day) 
First, suppose that neither city has any AV stockpile.  Figure 3.11 demonstrates model 
dynamics. 
 
                                                          
12
 Note that the change in the number of Susceptibles each day is a function of the difference in the 
number of Infected cases.  This is necessary in order to ensure that an equal number of people move in 
each direction, to ensure that the population sizes stay constant over time.  The model requires that we 
do not allow movement of Recovered individuals between cities (or that we interpret the Recovered 
category to be those who recovered while in city i), as doing so would cause the proportion of Recovered 
in each city to converge in the limit as t →∞ to the same vale in both cities. 
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Figure 3.11: Two city model dynamics 
 
 
The epidemic starts in A, and then spreads to B after a lag.  As long as IA > IB, City A is 
exporting infectious cases to B; when IA < IB city A is importing infectious cases from B.  
The epidemic peak is higher in B (and the ascent is steeper) because as the epidemic 
progresses in City B, B is also importing additional infectious cases from A.  However, 






























 Now the impact of adding AV treatment can be considered.  Migration between 
the cities means that the impact of AV is not the same as in the one-city case, there are 
externalities and complementarities across cities.  For example, suppose that only city A 
has a positive AV stockpile, while city B has no stockpile (PA* > 0.150, PB = 0). 


































 Panel A of Figure 3.12 shows the time path of the epidemic variables, Panel B 
shows the path of just IA(t) and IB(t), and Panel C compares the path of IB(t) in the case 
where neither city has any AV to the case where City A has a 15% stockpile.  The 
epidemic starts in A and increases more gradually than in the no AV case, because of AV 
treatment.  It spreads to B, where it spreads but still at a slower pace than in the no AV 
case, because there are fewer cases in A and so B is not importing as many infectious 
cases.  When A's stockpile is exhausted dI(t)/dt instantly rises in city A, but the impact on 
B is small, because the epidemic in B in this case is largely over.  The impact of A’s 
stockpile exhaustion on B would be more significant if it occurred earlier relative to B’s 
epidemic, either because A had a smaller stockpile or because the growth rate in B was 
lower.  The attack rate in A is 41.9%, as opposed to 58.8% with no AV.  There is a small 
positive externality to B from A's stockpile; the attack rate in B falls from 57.9% (when 
neither city has any AV) to 57.7% (when city A has a stockpile of 0.15).  There is also a 
















 Next, suppose that AV exists only in city B - suppose PA* = 0, PB* = 0.15.  Panel 
A of Figure 3.13 shows the time path of the epidemic variables, the second shows the 
path of just IA and IB, and the third compares the path of IA in the case where neither city 
has any AV to this case where City B has a 15% stockpile.  The stockpile in B has a 
major impact in B (reducing attack rate from 57.9% to 41.2%), and a small positive 
externality on city A (attack rate falls from 58.8% to 57.9%), because A is importing 
fewer infectious cases from B. 


































 Now, suppose that both cities have some AV stockpile.  Suppose PA* = PB* = 
0.15.  Figure 3.14 shows the model when both A and B have a stockpile of P*=0.15.  
Panels A and B show the epidemic dynamics in this scenario.  Panels C and D show how 
IA and IB differ between the case where both cities have an AV stockpile and the cases in 
which only A or B has a stockpile.  What is crucial to note is how large this difference is: 
when city i has a sizeable AV stockpile, the attack rate in i falls dramatically when city j 
also has a stockpile.  This highlights a key property of the model: AV stockpile sizes are 
strategic complements (over at least some range
13
).  City i's marginal gain from choosing 
a higher value of Pi* is increasing in Pj* for at least some values of Pi*, Pj*. 
  
                                                          
13

























































vi) Two city model, optimal stockpile sizes 
 Consider how cities choose an optimal stockpile size in this model.  Each city has 
preferences over the number of cases caused by the epidemic, and over the size of their 
stockpile (a larger stockpile is more expensive).  But the attack rate in each city is 


























      
            
    
         
   (18) 
where Ri(∞,.) is the terminal number of Recovered cases determined by the two-city 
epidemic model.  Suppose as before that Ki(.) = ViRi(∞,Pi,Pj), where Vi is the morbidity 
cost of an influenza case in city i.  If, for example, city i is poor while city j is rich, then 
the cities may have very different values of V.  Assume Ci(.) is linear and identical for 
both cities, so Ci(Pi*) = cPi*. 
 The function R(.) is not well-behaved, so it is easier to analyze its behavior 
through simulation.  Selecting parameter values of the model lets us run the simulation, 
and lets us trace out best response functions for each city, to find a Nash equilibrium.  
City i's best response function BRi(Pj*) is defined by: 
         
            
    
         
   (19) 
and a Nash equilibrium exists where each player chooses a value of Pi* such that both 
cities are choosing a mutual best response.  The shape of the best response functions and 
the properties of the Nash equilibrium depend crucially on the value of Vi relative to c.  
Several interesting cases arise.  Assume βA = βB = 0.3, ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.2, α = 0.01 as 
before. 
Case A: Mutual stockpiles. 
 Suppose VA = VB = 100, c = 10.  This leads to each city to choose the largest 
stockpile that it can use in each case,       
  , and noting that        is decreasing in Pj*.  
Figure 3.15 sketches the best response functions for each city.  The unique Nash 
equilibrium is at roughly [PA*= 0.144, PB* = 0.142].  The best response functions are 
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similar, but are not exactly symmetric, since the game is not exactly symmetric (the 
epidemic starts in city A).  In this case, both players choose the highest feasible levels of 
stockpile, and this is socially optimal. 
Figure 3.15: Two city model Nash equilibrium, mutual stockpiles 
 
Case B: Discontinuous best response functions 
 Suppose VA =5, VB = 100, c = 10.  Figure 3.16 shows how the best response 
functions can potentially be discontinuous.  The best response function for city B is the 
same as in Case A, but now City A's best response is to choose PA* = 0 for low values of 
PB*.  In this case, the Nash equilibrium is still roughly [0.144, 0.142] and this outcome 






















Figure 3.16: Two city model Nash equilibrium, discontinuous best response 
functions 
 
Case C: Inefficient outcome 
 Suppose VA = 3, VB = 100, c = 10.  In figure 3.17, the Nash equilibrium occurs at 
roughly [0, 0.17].  However, this outcome is socially inefficient.  At [0, 0.17], the total 
cost to City A is 1.69, the total cost to city B is 31.26, and so the total social cost is 32.97.  
However, at the [point 0.144,0.142] the total social cost is 27.05.  The Nash equilibrium 
is inefficient; it gives a higher social cost than the point which would be chosen by the 
social planner.  More importantly, there is scope for a Pareto improvement: if city B pays 
the entire treatment cost for the 0.144 stockpile in city A and the 0.142 stockpile in city 
B, the total costs borne by city B are only 26.36.  City B would be strictly better off if it 
purchased stockpile and donated it to city A, because of the positive externality to B. 
 Ideally, this kind of analysis would be carried out in the full GEM.  However, the 
















Chapter 5).  Instead the focus of analysis will be on policies that individual countries are 
likely to pursue.  
Figure 3.17: Two city Nash equilibrium, low value in city A 
 
 Analysis of these simple SIR models highlight several issues that warrant further 
investigation in a more realistic model.  How would a pandemic spread in a descriptively 
realistic model using real world data and parameter values?  How should stockpiles of 
antivirus be deployed in such a model?  How large are the externalities in AV treatment?  
Is there a pure efficiency case for rich, downstream countries to pay for antiviral doses 
for poor areas near the source of a pandemic?  How sensitive are answers to these 

















Chapter 4 A Global Epidemiological 
Model 
 While simple one- and two-city models can demonstrate the core qualitative 
properties of categorical epidemiological models, equilibrium outcomes in these models 
are highly dependent on particular parameter values.  This makes it difficult to draw 
policy conclusions from such simple models.  In order to address policy questions there is 
a need for a more complicated model that is sufficiently realistic to use real-world data 
for parameter value inputs. 
 This dissertation uses a version of the Global Epidemiological Model (GEM) 
developed by Goedecke and Bobashev and fully described in Hajdin et al. (2009), 
expanded and modified for the purposes of this research.  The GEM is a discrete time 
stochastic SEIR model designed to simulate the spread of a pandemic throughout the 
entire world.  The framework of the model was based on the work of Rvachev and 
Longini (1985) and on the epidemic model of Baroyan, Mironov, and Rvachev (1981).  
The GEM extends Rvachev and Longini by adding stochastic components, disease 
interventions, and a more detailed population structure.  This dissertation further extends 
the network structure and parameterizes the model, but does not use the full capability of 
the GEM in modeling disease state transitions or treatment options.  This chapter 
describes the mechanics of the model, and demonstrates the model dynamics in a baseline 
setting with no policy interventions. 
i) Network structure 
 The GEM tracks the spread of a pandemic through a network of cities and rural 
areas that span the globe.  The world is divided into 106 regions – each of which is either 
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an individual country or a group of countries
14
 (see Appendix 2).  Every region contains 
at least one city, and nearly all contain a rural area.  There are 288 cities and 101 rural 
areas, for a total of 389 network points.  The regions were selected using definitions from 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).  A rural area exists for every region except 
small islands and city states.  Cities were selected by choosing the union of: one city for 
every region; the largest 130 cities in the world by population; the 130 cities with the 
highest average airport flows per day; sufficient cities to ensure that every city is 
connected to a city in another region, and that the network is fully connected.
15
  Rural 
areas are defined as everything that is not explicitly urban, so the ―rural‖ areas contain the 
population of all cities in the world that are not explicitly included in the model.  Rural 
areas are treated the same as cities in the model, except that they are connected only to 
the cities within the same region, and not to cities in other regions.  Total world 
population is roughly 6.4 billion, of which roughly 84% is allocated to a rural area.  
 Cities and rural areas are connected by a daily flow between every city and its 
associated rural area, and by airline flows between cities.  It is assumed that 1% of the 
population of each urban area travels to its associated rural area each day, and an equal 
number travel from the rural area to the urban area
16
.  This assumption is somewhat 
                                                          
14
 Roughly 86% of the world's population live in a country that is its own region, the rest live in aggregate 
regions like "Caribbean", "Rest of Eastern Africa", "Rest of Western Asia". 
15
 This method means that we end up with many cities in rich countries, and relatively fewer cities in 
poorer countries.  Running the model with many rich country cities excluded had no significant impact on 
model results. 
16
 Attempts to estimate real world land travel rates using traffic count data encountered several 
problems.  First, while data was available in many rich countries, data in developing countries was sparse.  
Second, even the high quality developing data could be extremely misleading, as it was difficult to 
distinguish between commuters and travelers, leading to daily traffic flow estimates that could be as high 
as 15% of the value of the urban population.  Third, it was not possible to find reliable data for non-car 
based travel numbers. 
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arbitrary, but model results are not very sensitive to changes in travel rates
17
.  Cities are 
connected though 7,668 city-pair connections with a total global daily air movement of 
5,035,664 people per day.  Travelers are randomly selected from the available pool of 
Susceptible, Exposed, asymptomatic-Infectious and Recovered cases; symptomatic 
Infectious and Dead cases do not travel (these terms are described in section ii) below).  
This means that the pool of travelers (on average) is exposed or asymptomatic-infectious 
in the same proportions as the general population (once symptomatic-infectious cases and 
dead cases are excluded). 
 Data on airline flows is drawn from Official Airline Guide (OAG) statistics on 
flight schedules provided by Guimerà, Mossa, Turtschi, and Amaral (2005).  Air travel 
numbers are based on the daily seat capacity between each pair of cities for all cities in 
the model.  The raw data only tracks direct flights, but a proportion of travelers is 
assumed to take 2-leg indirect flights, following Epstein et al. (2007)
18
. 
 Data on regional populations is drawn from the World Bank development data 
portal.  Data on urban metropolitan area populations is taken from several sources, 
primarily the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects (2007), and uses broad 
                                                          
17
 Running the model with doubled and halved travel rates had no significant impact on attack rates by 
the end of the pandemic. 
18
 A dataset of 10% of domestic US airline ticket coupons for 2004 is used to estimate the proportion of 
travelers on any city pair who travel through a connecting airport, rather than directly.  These estimates 
are then applied to the cities in the GEM, taking the OAG data for international travel and applying 
estimates that split the daily travel numbers on each city pair into 1-leg travelers and 2-leg travelers.  For 
example for flights from Jakarta to Singapore and Singapore to New Delhi, a proportion of Jakarta to 
Singapore travelers are assumed to actually be 2-leg travelers moving between Jakarta and New Delhi 
(and similarly a proportion are assumed to be traveling from Jakarta to every other city connected to 
Singapore).  On average, 68.2% of tickets are assumed to be 1-leg, and 31.8% are assumed to be 2-leg 
(though this varies across each city pair in the model). 
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definitions of urban areas to try to capture the greater metropolitan population
19
.  Rural 
area populations are calculated by deducting urban populations from regional 
populations. 
 The GEM does not track individuals – it tracks only the size of each SEIR 
category in each city in each period.  This means round-trip travelers cannot be 
distinguished from one-way travelers.  In the real world, if a person flies from City A to 
City B or drives from city A to Rural Area C, then it is likely that they will return.  But in 
the GEM, once that person travels to B or C, they enter the uniform mixing pool of their 
destination, and are no more likely to travel elsewhere than any other member of their 
new city. 
ii) Disease spread mechanics 
 In each city or rural area, the population is divided into Susceptible, Exposed 
(infected but not yet Infectious), Infectious, Recovered and Dead disease state categories.  
Infectious cases may be either symptomatic or asymptomatic; asymptomatic cases are 
less infectious, will not be treated, and will still travel between cities.  At time zero, the 
entire population is Susceptible, except for a small number of Exposed cases in a single 
outbreak city.  A Suspectible individual who is contacted by an Infectious individual may 
be infected and become Exposed.  Every Exposed case transitions to an Infectious case, 
and then every Infectious cases either recovers or dies. 
 Within each region the population is divided into 4 age categories; under 5 years, 
5-14 years, 15-64 years and 65+ years, denoted with indexes a = 0,1,2,3, respectively.  
This allows incorporation of age-specific contact rates and to observe the incidence of the 
                                                          
19
 Some cities are urban agglomerations of multiple cities, like Washington DC-Baltimore. 
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pandemic by age-group.  Data on population age structure is drawn from United Nations 
World Population Prospects for 2007.  Within each city or rural area, the population is 
assumed to mix uniformly; every person in city i with the same characteristics (disease 
state, age, treatment status, infectiousness duration) is assumed to be identical.   
For city i  on day t  define a set of variables
20
 : S(i,a,t), E(i,τ,a,t), I(i,s,θ,a,t), 
R(i,a,t) and D(i,a,t) for those individuals who are Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, 
Recovered or Dead, respectively.  Define τ as the number of days a since a person 
became infected, so a new Exposed individual who has just become infected has τ = 0.  
Define   as the maximum number of days that a person may remain exposed before 
becoming Infectious, and    as the maximum number of days a person may remain 
infected before becoming Recovered or Dead.  Those who are Exposed on day t  were 
infected with the disease  days earlier, on day t - τ.  Those who are Infectious on day t 
became infectious θ days earlier, on day t – θ.  Infectious individuals may be either 
Asymptomatic  0s  or Symptomatic  1s .  From this point forward the city index i 
is suppressed for notational simplicity, but it is important to remember that each variable 
is city specific. 
 Given this notation, population of a city can be defined as the sum of this set of 
mutually exclusive disease states: 
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 It is convenient to describe the model in terms of city i, but note that this can refer to either a city or a 
rural area.  In the notation that follows, each of these variables is particular to city i, but this notation is 




                                                  
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
(20) 
Variables can be aggregated across age groups, such that: 
                              
 
    
                                         
 
    
                             
 
    
(21) 
A new Exposed case is the result of contact between a Susceptible person and an 
Infectious person.  The daily infectious contact rate between age-groups j and k is defined 
as λjk (see below).  This parameter λjk is equivalent to the parameter β in the simple SIR 
models in the preceding chapter.   
 Define γ(τ) as the probability that an Exposed case becomes Infectious, and σ(θ) 
as the probability that an Infectious person recovers.  Assume for simplicity (following 
Longini 2005) that 80% of Exposed cases transition to Infectious after 1 day and 20% 
after 2 days; they will become symptomatic-Infectious with probability 2/3 and 
asymptomatic-Infectious with probability 1/3.  Infectious cases either recover or die after 
3-6 days since they became infectious, with 30% recovering after 3 days, 40% after 5 
days, 20% after 5 days, and 10% after 6 days.  This means   = 1 and    = 5.  Thus: 
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(23) 
 Define r(s) as the relative infectiousness of symptomatic state s, and f(t) as a 
seasonality factor.  Based on Ferguson, et al. (2005) and Longini, et al. (2005), it is 
assumed that r(s) = 1 if a person is symptomatic (s=1) and r(s) = 0.5 if a person is 
asymptomatic (s=0).  Seasonality is discussed in part iv) below.  Groups within a city mix 
uniformly, so the average number of new Exposed cases caused by one Infectious person 
in city i on day t is proportional to the number of Susceptible individuals in that city and 
is equal to λ
.
S(t)/N.  Ignoring travel between cities for the moment, the total number of 
Exposed cases of age k in city i evolves by:  
(24) 






         
      
             
               
 
   
    
  
   
 
   
         
                                
  
and the number of infectious cases of age k in city i evolves by: 
 






                
 
   
        











                
 
   
        






for symptomatic and asymptomatic cases, respectively.  It is assumed 97.5% of 
symptomatic cases recover and 2.5% die, while 98.75% of asymptomatic cases recover 
and 1.25% die. 
21
  So the number of Recovered cases evolves by: 
 
                                                      
 
   
  




and the number of Dead cases of age k evolves by:  
 
                                                    
 
   
  
   
 
(28) 
 The preceding describes an S-E-I-R model with no travel. In the model, 
the evolution of S(.), E(.), I(.), R(.) and D(.) are determined by both these equations and 
by travel between cities.  There is a fixed number of seats available Xij for travelers 
moving between two cities i and j determined either from the airline data (for city to city 
travel) or 1% of the urban population (for city to rural travel).  Each Susceptible, 
Exposed, Asymptomatic Infectious and Recovered individual has a probability of travel 
calculated by: 
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 This assumption is highly speculative, but gross attack rates would be similar so long as case fatality 
rates remained small.  Slight differences would occur because deceased are not contacted by others.  At a 
lower case fatality the proportion of proportion of Recovered people contacted by an infectious individual 
would be slightly higher, and the proportion of Susceptibles contacted would be slightly lower.  The 
combined effect would be for the pandemic to spread slightly more slowly, but the effect would be 
minimal for low case fatality rates (for example, 0-3%).  Increasing the case fatality rate further would 
have the opposite effect.  Since the case fatality rate is highly speculative, results analysis focuses on 




              
      
        
 
(29) 
The expected number of travelers of a particular subgroup who move from i to j on a 
particular day is the product of the number of persons in the subgroup multiplied by 
            .22   
iii) Contact rates 
 The key parameter determining the spread of the pandemic is λjk, the (city-
specific) daily infectious contact rate.  This parameter defines the number of new exposed 
cases of age k generated by an infectious individual of age j.  The rate is determined by 
two components: the number of people contacted daily by an infectious individual,
23
 and 
the probability of transmission given contact.  The contact rates are described by a matrix 
Ci whose elements Cijk describe the number of contacts per day that a person of age j has 
with people of age k in city i.  The P(T|C) is chosen by the modeler to determine the 
reproductive rate of the virus (determined by the particular biological characteristics of 
the specific influenza strain), and is constant in every city and age-group. 
 A key aspect of the modification of the GEM for this research has been an effort 
to incorporate realistic information on contact rates, so as to be able to partially explain 
observed variation in attack rates by age-group and to model variation in contact rates 
across urban/rural status and across countries.  This dissertation derives its assumptions 
on age-specific contact rates from survey data from European countries as reported in 
                                                          
22
 This means that the expected number of travelers moving from i to j will be less than Xij , as long as 
there are any cases who are symptomatic infectious or dead, since these people do not travel. 
23
 A contact is assumed to be a physical contact, where two individuals encounter each other closely 
enough that there is a chance of influenza transmission.  The precise definition of contact can be unclear 
in the literature, and this can complicate use of data where individuals report the number of contacts they 
undertake per day. 
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Mossong et al. (2009).  The method by which the contact rate matrix (and thus λjk) is 
derived is described in Appendix 3. 
 Contact rates vary by age-group; in general each age-group is more likely to 
contact people of their own age than other ages; school children contact mostly other 
school-children, adults contact mostly other adults, and so forth.  School-age children 
have the highest contact rates, while elderly people have the lowest contact rates.  This 
pattern influences the incidence of influenza cases across age-groups.  However, it is 
assumed that the total absolute number of contacts per day does not vary across cities 




 Contact rates are adjusted across cities by urban density (for cities) and by the 
urbanization rate of the ―rural‖ areas (see Appendix 2 for details).  This has the effect of 
increasing contact rates (and thus attack rates) for cities in lower income countries (which 
tend to have high density cities), and for rural areas in higher income countries (which 
have higher urbanization rates). 
 A model extension could allow the P(T|C) to vary by age-groups, so that for 
example a child or elderly individual might be more likely to contract the virus than a 
healthy adult.  But this dissertation retains the assumption of a constant P(T|C) for two 
reasons.  First, reliable data on relative vulnerabilities is not available, and the 
relationship between age and vulnerability is not clear.  While the elderly may have 
poorer health and weaker overall immune systems, older individuals are also more likely 
                                                          
24
 An alternative treatment that held absolute contact rates constant for each age-group would increase 
average contact rates and thus transmission rates and attack rates in countries with younger populations. 
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to have encountered related influenza strains in the past, and so may have developed 
some natural resistance.  In the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, evidence suggests that healthy 
young adults may have been more vulnerable than older adults or children.  Second, this 
research does not examine non-pharmaceutical interventions, and so the epidemiological 
consequences of allowing the P(T|C) to vary by age-group would be very similar to the 
consequences from incorporating variation in contact rates by age-group - both have the 
affect of introducing age-dependent transmissibility.  For example, doubling the P(T|C) 
for some particular age-group pair would have a similar affect as doubling the number of 
daily contacts.  If the model were to examine policies that affected contact rates, then it 
would be more important to separate age-specific contacts from age-specific 
transmissibility. 
iv) Seasonality 
 One of the key stylized facts of influenza is that infection rates are much higher in 
winter months than in summer in temperate zones, but that there is less seasonal variation 
in tropical or arctic conditions.  The mechanism for this is not well understood.  Theories 
focus on both biological mechanisms and behavioral mechanisms.  Biological 
mechanisms include the possibility that the influenza virus is more fragile in warmer 
temperatures and has lower transmission at higher humidity (confirmed in controlled 
environment tests, e.g. Lowen et al. (2008)), perhaps because virus particles are coated in 
moisture and less able to infect new hosts.  Shaman and Kohn (2009) find that absolute 
humidity (rather than relative humidity) explains the seasonal variation of influenza in 
temperate zones, with lower transmissibility at higher humidity.  Behavioral mechanisms 
suggest that in winter months (particularly in higher latitudes) people spend more time 
indoors in close proximity, and so have higher contact rates and thus a higher daily 
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infectious contact rate.  In this dissertation, seasonality is incorporated by adjusting 
infectiousness rates rather than contact rates. 
 Existing global influenza models attempt to account for seasonality; most global 
pandemic models use some kind of step function as an approximation, where seasonality 
is constant for tropical regions and is lower during summer months in the temperate 
zones.  For example,  Colizza et al. (2007) divides the world into three zones; northern 
hemisphere, tropical, southern hemisphere.  They assume constant seasonal 
transmissibility in the tropical zone, and use a seasonal transmissibility factor that varies 
between 0.1 in summer and 1.1 in winter in the temperate zones, using a monthly 
stepwise function such that the average temperate zone transmissibility is 68.3% of that 
in the tropical zone.  The GEM takes a similar approach, but incorporates seasonality 
through a continuous seasonality infectiousness factor multiplier f(t) that varies by day of 
the year and by latitude of the city.
25
  Infectiousness is assumed to be constant in the 
tropics, and elsewhere to follow a sinusoidal pattern where it is at maximum value on 
January 1 in the northern hemisphere (July 1 in the southern hemisphere) and minimum 
value on July 1 in the northern hemisphere (January 1 in the southern hemisphere).  
Specifically, for city i the seasonality factor is given by: 
 
                                           
        




Li is the latitude of city i (interpreting southern hemisphere as negative latitude), where t0 
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 The GEM uses the population-weighted mean latitude of the modeled cities in a region for the latitude 
of that region’s rural area. 
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is the day of the year corresponding to the start of the pandemic, and where i  scales Li 
to a value between 0 and 1 according to: 
 
               
         
         
   
(31) 
 
where 23.5 is the absolute value latitude of the tropics and 66.5 is the absolute latitude of 
the Arctic/Antarctic circles.  The i function thus implies that the seasonality factor is 
constant in the tropics, has increasing amplitude through the temperate zone, and does not 
increase in amplitude further in the polar zones.  The maximum value is constant for all 
latitudes, so the increasing amplitude means that in higher latitudes the average 
seasonality factor is lower - and so disease transmission (and thus attack rates) attack 
rates are highest in the tropics, and are lower the further a country is from the equator (up 
to the polar boundary).  
 Figure 4.1 shows the seasonality factors for Singapore (in the tropics), New York 
(temperate, northern hemisphere) and Sydney (temperate, southern hemisphere) with a 
pandemic starting on January 1 (winter in the northern hemisphere).  Note that New York 
is further north than Sydney is south, and so New York’s seasonality factor has higher 
amplitude and a lower mean value.  These imply that all else equal, Singapore will have a 




Figure 4.1: Seasonality factor for selected cities 
 
 Unfortunately, there is little empirical data on which to base this assumption.  
Cooper et al. (2006) compare a constant-maximum infectiousness model (as latitude 
changes) to a constant-mean model and finds the former performs slightly better when 
trying to fit observed attack rates from the 1968/69 influenza pandemic.  They also find 
that a sine wave functional form fits the data better than a square wave or no seasonal 
variation.
 26
  In contrast, evidence from Shaman and Kahn (2009) suggests that influenza 
seasonality is driven largely by absolute humidity.  Absolute humidity is always high in 
the tropics but is high in temperate zones only in summer, which suggests that a constant 
minimum model may be more accurate than a constant-maximum model.  But, further 
evidence is lacking.  This is unfortunate, since this seasonality assumption has a huge 
impact on pandemic dynamics and on the incidence of attack rates across countries. 
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 While this functional form matches the single peaked seasonal pattern observed in many countries, it 



















v) Performance of the GEM with no policy interventions 
 Before moving on to consider policy interventions in the GEM, it is useful to first 
describe the auxiliary assumptions made in running the GEM, and to demonstrate the 
performance of the model in the baseline scenario. 
 Though the GEM is stochastic, the main simulations are run using a deterministic 
version of the model where each random variable
27
 is assumed to take the mean value of 
its distribution (and so the model allows for fractional values of S(t), E(t), I(t), R(t) and 
D(t)).  This reduces the number of runs that needs to be performed by an order of 
magnitude.  While there is some variation across runs in the early stages of the stochastic 
model, the terminal values of key variables are nearly identical across runs of the 
stochastic model
28
.  This means the model loses the ability to consider variation in early 
spread patterns, but also that the model run-time is drastically reduced, and so many more 
scenarios can be examined given the limited computing time available. 
 The pandemic is assumed to begin with 100 infectious cases on January 1 in 
Jakarta.
29
  While the state of the model is observed for every day over the 3-year period 
for which the simulations run, analysis is focused on the attack rate after 1 year.  This is a 
somewhat arbitrary cutoff (though it is common in the literature), but in part it represents 
the approximate amount of time that it might take to develop, test and mass produce a 
pandemic-strain-specific vaccine.  Though any influenza vaccine remains exogenous, it is 
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 The probability of transmission given contact, the probability of recovery and the probability of travel 
are the key random variables in the stochastic version of the model. 
28
 The global attack rate is identical to five significant figures across stochastic runs. 
29
 There is no particular reason to pre-suppose that Jakarta is particularly likely to be a start point.  A 
pandemic influenza strain that mutates from an avian or other animal strain is more likely to occur in a 
country where people in rural areas live in close proximity to livestock, but depending on the movement 
of the first few cases an outbreak could occur virtually anywhere.  Jakarta was selected as a city in a large 
poor country that is well-connected to the international airline network. 
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an important motivating factor behind why consideration of attack rates after particular 
duration, rather than considering only the long-run steady state condition where the 
pandemic would be completely over without any further intervention.  Many of the gains 
from antivirus policy come from delaying the spread of the virus, and delay is valuable in 
part because it buys time for vaccination development. 
 Every region in the model is assigned to an Income Group
30
; countries either 
Poor, Lower Middle, Upper Middle or Rich (see Appendix 2).  This classification is 
useful for defining antiviral scenarios where the size of the stockpile differs depending on 
the purchasing power and public health system of the country in question (such as a 
scenario where rich countries have a large AV stockpile but poor countries do not), and is 
a useful means of showing the distributional impact of policies
31
.   
Figure 4.2: Distribution of population by income group and age-group 
 
Total age 0 age 1 age 2 age 3 
Poor 2,839,998,811 352,152,534 647,655,318 1,716,456,775 123,734,183 
Lower_Middle 2,156,161,724 165,680,600 361,106,698 1,473,910,542 155,463,884 
Upper_Middle 515,385,759 36,733,909 79,318,428 349,989,705 49,343,717 
Rich 914,861,650 53,135,831 109,758,061 610,674,513 141,293,245 
TOTAL 6,426,407,944 607,702,874 1,197,838,506 4,151,031,535 469,835,029 
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 Income groups classifications are based on International Monetary Fund data on nominal 2008 GDP per 
capita, at 2008 exchange rates.  Poor countries are those with GDP per capita less than $USD 3,000, Lower 
Income are those with GDP per capita up to $10,000, Upper Middle have income up to $20,000 and Rich 
countries are those with incomes exceeding $20,000.  For regions with multiple countries, the median 
income country is used to classify the region.  We use this classification (rather than say the World Bank 
income group classifications) because we feel it is more representative of public health sector 
infrastructure. 
31
 The identical nature of agents within a city or rural area mean that we cannot capture distributional 
consequences within a country, though it is likely that higher income people will have better access to 
healthcare services including antivirals and may have lower contact rates than lower income people (eg 
by driving rather than using public transport). 
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 The baseline scenario assumes a "moderate" P(T|C) value of 0.05333, which 
implies a global average R0 value of 1.48 (and an R0 in the outbreak source Jakarta of 
1.91). This value is somewhat arbitrary, but is designed to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of antivirus while remaining above the range where a small amount of anti-virus is able 
to prevent occurrence of a pandemic.  "Low" and "High" values of P(T|C) are assumed to 
be P(T|C) = 0.045 and 0.06, respectively, which imply global average R0 values of 1.25 
and 1.67. 
 Figure 4.3 shows how the pandemic progresses in this baseline scenario.  Panel A 
shows behavior of the global categorical variables (from aggregating each state across all 
cities and rural areas) for the entire 3-year run of the simulation model.  Panel B shows 
the number of new infectious cases on each day, broken down across the 4 income 
groups, while Panel C shows the data but concentrates on the first year of the pandemic. 
Panel D shows the incidence of attack rates (total proportion of people ever infected) by 
country income group
32
, while Panel E shows the incidence by age-group. 
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 Recall that this is incidence across countries by the average income of the country; the model says 
nothing about incidence varying by income within a particular country. 
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 On day 1, the entire world is susceptible (except 100 infectious cases in Jakarta).  
Over time some people become Exposed, Infectious and then Recover or Die, first at an 
increasing rate though to the primary pandemic peak and then at a decreasing rate as the 
pandemic passes its peak (and the reproductive rate falls below 1 in most countries).  A 
secondary wave occurs after roughly 300 days, as the northern hemisphere (where most 
of the population lives) re-enters winter.  Most cases occur within a year; the 1-year 
attack rate is 44.6%, rising to 49.9% after 3 years. 
 Attack rates are higher in poor countries and lower in rich countries, due primarily 
to the positive correlation of income and latitude (see below.  Rich countries have a larger 
increase in attack rate after the first year because they are at higher latitude, and so are 
more affected by seasonality, and so have a larger number of cases from the second 
pandemic wave.  School-age children suffer higher attack rates than other age-groups, 
because of their high contact rates; the elderly suffer lower attack rates because of their 
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 Attack rates and attack rate incidence are highly sensitive to the pandemic start 
date, due to the interaction of start date and seasonality assumptions.  Figure 4.4 
compares the pandemic time path and attack rates for a January 1 start date (where the 
pandemic peaks during northern hemisphere summer) as compared to a July 1 start date 
(where the pandemic peaks during northern hemisphere winter).  The secondary infection 
wave occurs in the Jan1 scenario only because the pandemic is choked off prematurely by 
rising temperatures as the northern hemisphere enters summer, while in the July1 
scenario northern hemisphere temperatures are cooling as the disease spreads and so the 
pandemic reaches a single, more intense peak.  The increase in attack rate after 1-year is 
largest for rich countries, due to the truncation of the full pandemic impact created by 
looking only at a 1-year attack rate. 




























Panel A: Pandemic time path
January 1 start date





 The incidence of attack rates across income groups is driven in large part by the 
combination of the seasonality assumptions and the real world correlation between 
income and latitude; countries more distant from the equator have lower average 
seasonality factors, and so lower attack rates.  Figure 4.5 displays the distribution of 
attack rates (after 3 years) by latitude across the GEM's 106 regions.  Panel A shows the 
distribution of regions across latitude by income group, and demonstrates the stylized fact 
that higher income countries lie further from the equator.  Panel B shows attack rates 
under a January 1 start date, while Panel C shows attack rates under a July 1 start date. 
 Recall that the seasonality factor is constant in the tropics (between positive and 
negative 23.5 degrees latitude) and then average infectiousness decreases with distance 
from the equator.  This explains why attack rates are roughly constant in the tropics, and 
then generally decreasing away from the tropics.  The decrease is larger for the northern 
hemisphere in panel B and the southern hemisphere in panel C, because of the timing of 














Panel B: Attack rates after 1 year
January 1 start date
July 1 start date
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summer).  Variation in attack rates not due to latitude (the upward slope above ~mid 30s 
latitude in Panel B for example) are largely due to the structure of the international airline 
network and regional populations (and so the number and timing of exposed cases 
imported) and to variation in density and urbanization rates across countries.   Cities in 
poorer countries are more likely to be high density (increasing contact and attack rates), 
but poorer countries tend to have lower urbanization rates(decreasing contact and attack 
rates). 











 A higher value of P(T|C) results in a faster pandemic and a higher attack rate (and 
the opposite for a lower P(T|C) value) while retaining similar qualitative properties (see  
Figure 4.6).  In a "severe" pandemic with P(T|C) = 0.06 the global 1-year attack rate rises 
to 53.3%, while in a "minor" pandemic with P(T|C) = 0.045 the global 1-year attack rate 



































Panel C: July 1 start: Terminal attack rate incidence by latitude
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 Results are generally insensitive to travel rate assumptions.  Figure 4.7 shows that 
1-year attack rates for wealthier countries vary slightly with a doubling or halving of 
travel rates, and the impact on terminal attack rates after 3 years is minimal.  Adjusting 
travel rates has two effects; a higher travel rate means a slightly faster pandemic spread 
(which might be expected to lead to higher attack rates), but a higher attack rate also 













































attack rates depending on whether it shifts the pandemic peak towards or away from 
summer in the northern hemisphere).  It appears that the second effect dominates; attack 
rates are marginally lower with higher travel rates.  The apparent insensitivity of attack 
rates to travel rates implies that airline travel restrictions would be relatively ineffective 
(as in Epstein et al. 2007). 
















Panel A: 1-year attack rates
Normal travel rate
Doubled travel rate 
(airline only)
Doubled travel rate 
(airline and urban/rural)
Halved travel rate (airline 
only)















Panel B: 3-year attack rates
Normal travel rate
Doubled travel rate 
(airline only)
Doubled travel rate 
(airline and urban/rural)
Halved travel rate (airline 
only)




 While the GEM has not been formally validated against modern pandemics, 
earlier versions of the GEM have been compared to those of earlier pandemic models.  
Rvachev and Longini (1985) test their model against the 1968-9 pandemic starting in 
Hong Kong, and found an approximate fit to the first wave of the pandemic, though they 
noted that there was often little empirical data with which to compare their model - either 
the data were not collected, or there was no actual outbreak in some cities.  Grais et al. 
(2003) expand the model, and validate their model by reproducing the Rvachev and 
Longini results.  In unpublished background work, Goedecke and Bobashev find that the 
GEM is able to replicate the Rvachev and Logini results when running the GEM with 
1968 parameters.  
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Chapter 5 Policy interventions in the 
Global Epidemiological Model 
 Single-city and two-city epidemic models are unable are to give policy results that 
are robust to any input parameters.  To progress further some idea of what is a 
"reasonable" input parameter is needed, but it is difficult to make judgments about what 
inputs are realistic in such highly stylized models.  Adopting the GEM allows policy 
questions to be approached using a model with a high degree of descriptive realism, and 
allows use of data inputs and assumptions based on observable or semi-observable real 
world parameter values.  This chapter describes how and why the GEM is adapted to 
focus on antivirus stockpiles, and presents results on: the value of antivirus in reducing 
the number of influenza cases, the incentive for wealthy countries to pay for antivirus in 
poor countries, the effectiveness of various antivirus stockpile allocation rules, the value 
of improving health infrastructure and the cost effectiveness of antivirus policy options. 
i) The GEM and Antivirals 
 The generalized version of the GEM is capable of modeling several policy 
interventions; it can model vaccine use (which reduces the probability that a vaccinated 
Susceptible case will be infected if contacted), it can model travel restrictions (where 
cities cut air travel links), it can model non-pharmaceutical interventions such as physical 
distancing measures or partial quarantine (which reduce contact rates) or it can model 
treatment with antivirals (which reduces the probability that an infectious individual will 
infect others when contacted).  This research focuses on antivirals.   
 The GEM is not very helpful in changing our understanding of vaccine policy 
issues.  As in the 2009 influenza pandemic, by the time a pandemic influenza strain has 
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been detected and a strain-specific vaccine has been developed, mass produced and 
distributed, it is highly likely that a severe pandemic will have already run its course 
(though a milder pandemic that spreads more slowly may still be susceptible to 
significant mitigation through vaccine).  The externalities of vaccine are relatively well 
understood (see for example Boulier et al. 2007); there is a strong "herd immunity" effect 
from preventative vaccination, and so mass prophylaxis with vaccine can be highly 
effective. 
 Travel restrictions have been studied using an earlier version of the GEM in 
Epstein et al. (2007).  In general, travel restrictions are not very effective for most cities 
unless they are absolute and can be implemented extremely early (which is difficult to do 
when a pandemic may not be detected for weeks or months), because after a relatively 
small number of infectious cases exist in a city most of the additional contagion comes 
from natural increase rather than by importing infected cases.  In the modern global 
economy absolute travel restrictions are extremely expensive, which limits their realistic 
effectiveness as a policy measure. 
 The GEM is capable of modeling physical distancing measures, such as school 
closures or workplace closures.  These policies reduce the contact rates of individuals in 
particular age-groups (though they might also increase contact rates between other age-
groups); for example, a school closure policy might reduce the rate at which children 
contact other children, but might increase the rate at which children contact adults.  
However, the effect of physical distancing measures in an epidemiological model is very 
similar to the effect of antivirals.  What matters is the daily infectious contact rate, and so 
the effect of physical distancing measures that reduce the number of contacts will be 
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almost identical to antivirus treatment policies that reduce the probability of transmission 
given contact by an equivalent amount.  There is also less policy value from considering 
external benefits from physical distancing, since it would be difficult for one country to 
pay for another country to undertake physical distancing measures (in contrast to 




 The GEM is prescriptive, rather than agent-based.  Though governments 
implement policy actions, these policies are imposed as part of the model design, rather 
than policies that are selected optimally
34
.  Individuals in the model make no decisions.  
They do not change their travel patterns in response to the pandemic, either at a global 
level (by reducing or changing the pattern of their movement between cities to avoid 
areas where the contact risk is high) or at a local level (by reducing their contact rates per 
day through self-sequestration when they are infectious, or self-isolation when there are 
many other infectious cases present in their city).  Instead, people are assumed to act in a 
way dictated by parameter estimates calculated from behavior observed in non-pandemic 
settings.  This will tend to lead to over-estimates of disease spread and attack rates from 
the GEM, relative to a real world pandemic. 
 There are agent-based epidemiological models that incorporate prevalence-elastic 
behavior endogenously, but not at the global scale of the GEM.  The sheer scale of the 
GEM makes individual optimization infeasible; the computational power needed to 
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 However, it might be possible for a donor country to partially subsidize physical distancing measures by 
providing masks or gloves. 
34
 The GEM is motivated by the idea that there is an initial first step where governments are 
simultaneously choosing an optimal stockpile size for their region, but this is not explicit in the model. 
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calculate optimizing decisions by individuals or even representative agents of every type 
in every city in every day would be extremely high.  Such models are more effective 
when used in a smaller setting or a model with less detail. 
 The GEM is a model of perfect information.  Even if the model included a step 
where governments chose an optimal stockpile size, it would still have to assume that the 
decision was made with perfect knowledge that a pandemic influenza strain with 
particular properties (start date, start location, biological properties such as transmission 
rate and recovery rate) will occur with probability 1.  In reality, governments have to 
make pandemic plans and decisions about AV stockpiles without knowing whether or 
when a pandemic will occur. 
 The GEM is a large and complex model – the runtime of the model is significant 
even when using considerable computing power.  This limits the number of model runs 
that can realistically be undertaken in a research project, and so limits the ability to 
explore the parameter space.  In particular, it rules out the feasibility of doing the kind of 
optimization calculations that would be needed in order to calculate Nash equilibria in a 
formal strategic version of the model, with Regions or Super-Regions choosing stockpile 
sizes to maximize an objective function.  This limits the ability to conduct formal 
economic analysis, but some important insights can be gained from examining particular 
parts of the parameter space to inform policy questions. 
 The GEM is not an effective model for tracking containment strategies.  In some 
cases it may be possible to contain a virulent new influenza strain, and prevent a 
pandemic from occurring.  In practice, this requires public health officials to perform a 
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focused contact-tracing procedure, where they target pharmaceutical interventions (such 
as antivirus) and physical distancing measures (such as quarantine) to specific individuals 
that may have had contact with early infectious individuals.  This kind of process can be 
modeled, but it requires a hierarchical social network model that can differentiate 
between individuals of varying probabilities of having contacted an infectious individual, 
rather than the homogenous mixing procedures calculated in the GEM. 
ii) Effects of Antivirus treatment 
 Following Longini et al. (2005), it is assumed that treating infectious cases with 
antivirus has two effects
35
: treatment reduces the probability of transmission given 
contact by a multiplicative factor (1 – e) where e is the efficacy of the antivirus,
36
 and it 
reduces the average duration spent Infectious by one day, by uniformly shifting the 
probability distribution downwards.  This means that an Infectious individual treated with 
AV will recover after 2-5 days of being Infectious (rather than 3-6 days for untreated 
individuals), with 30% recovering after 2 days, 40% after 3 days, 20% after 4 days, and 
10% after 5 days, and so: 
   
 






           
                  
                  
        
           
  
(32) 
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 Another possibility would be for treatment to reduce the case fatality rate, but here we focus on attack 
rates rather than mortality rates and so we do not consider this possibility.  A modest reduction in case 
fatality rates will have little impact on the model dynamics or on the total number of people ever 
infected, but it could dramatically increase the value of avoiding a case. 
36
 It is assumed that this efficacy is constant throughout the pandemic.  The model does not allow for an 
AV-resistant strain to develop during the pandemic, which might be possible in the real world.  An AV-





 Each region has an AV stockpile size P*(r), and an amount of stockpile remaining 
P(r,t).  AV held by region r will be used to treat people in all cities (including the rural 
area) within that region.  It is assumed that AV stockpile distribution begins in city i only 
when 1,000 people have become infectious in city i, 
37
 and then continues until there is no 
AV remaining in the region.  Note however that in many cases a large stockpile in a 
region will not be exhausted.  Any doses not consumed are wasted. 
 It is assume that a constant proportion p of symptomatic-Infectious cases are 
treated with AV (asymptomatic cases are not treated)
38
.  This is a highly unrealistic 
assumption; real world treatment rates will vary depending on a number of factors 
including health system infrastructure and the proportion of the population infected.  
Unfortunately, there is little reliable data in which to build a plausible location-specific 
treatment number.  In most model runs it is assumed that p = 0.5, so one-third of 
infectious cases are treated (while one-third are symptomatic but untreated and one-third 
are asymptomatic but untreated).  This treatment occurs only after 1 day, so newly 
Infectious cases have 1 full day to infect others before they receive treatment to reduce 
their infectiousness.   
 Assume that there are no type 1 errors in treatment – AV doses are never used to 
treat non-infectious cases.  While unrealistic, this assumption is relatively harmless, since 
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 This assumption is designed to model the difficulty in detecting the pandemic strain of influenza 
particularly against the “background noise” of regular seasonal influenza cases.  Sensitivity tests show that 
final attack rates are not significantly affected by changing the number of cases needed before 
distribution begins, except in the special case of low P(T|C) where early detection will significantly reduce 
the number of cases, particularly in the outbreak source country where early detection can mean the 
outbreak is contained and no pandemic occurs. 
38
 Treatment of influenza with AV involves a 5-day course of AV being consumed at a rate of 2 pills per 
day, so we assume each “dose” of AV is enough for the 5 day course. 
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the stockpile size could simply be increased in every city by some factor and receive the 
same qualitative results (treating x cases with no type 1 error is similar to treating 1.25x 
cases with a 20% false positive rate). 
 Antivirus is not used as prophylaxis.  Though prophylactic use does have some 
medical benefit (a Susceptible individual treated with AV will have a lower probability of 
being infected if contacted), preliminary investigations with the GEM indicated that 
prophylactic use is relatively ineffective at influencing the pandemic spread.  This occurs 
in part because the effect of being treated wears off rapidly after treatment ceases, and so 
prophylactic treatment is effective on a Susceptible person who is contacted during the 
brief duration in which the dose is effective.  So a vast numbers of doses would be 
needed to sustain any significant reduction in the population at large.  Those doses could 
be more effectively used for treating actual infectious cases rather than trying to blanket 
the population. 
 How will countries choose their antivirus stockpile?  Ideally I could consider the 
possibility of locally and globally optimal allocation rules, assuming some welfare 
function that compared the social value of preventing cases across different countries.
39
  
But in practice, the GEM is too complicated for the optimal allocation to be calculated.  
An input parameter for the GEM with a stockpile allocation is a vector with 106 variables 
(and so 105 degrees of freedom for any given stockpile size) and so the number of 
possible combinations is enormous.  It is not possible to predict the outcome of attack 
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 Such a welfare function might value all cases equally across all countries, or might value cases as a 
function of the dollar cost of cases in different countries (and so cases prevented in rich countries might 
be treated as more valuable than cases prevented in poor countries).  Different beliefs about an 
appropriate global welfare function would lead to radically different outcomes. 
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rates across country without actually running the GEM, which takes over 30 minutes per 
run, and so it is infeasible to run the model enough times for any kind of optimization 
algorithm to converge.  Instead, I examine the effects of antivirus by concentrating on a 
set of "plausible" antivirus stockpile combinations, where wealthier countries have larger 
AV stockpiles while poorer countries have smaller or no access to AV (unless it is 
provided to them by donors). 
 This notation indicates that all regions in the Poor income group have a stockpile 
size of a% of their population, Lower middle income regions have a stockpile size of b%, 
and so forth.
40
  The four scenarios are (A) 0/0/5/10; (B) 0/1/5/10; (C) 1/1/5/10 and (D) 
0/1/5/10 + a 4.2% stockpile for the outbreak country, Indonesia, which is in the Poor 
income group.  The combined stockpile size of all rich regions is 91.5 and 25.8 million 
doses for all upper middle income regions (10% and 5% of their respective populations) 
in all scenarios.
41
 The difference between scenario A and scenario B could be interpreted 
as a gift from wealthier countries of 21.5 million doses to Lower Middle income 
countries (equal 1% of their population), while the movement from B to C is equivalent 
to rich countries paying for 28.4 million doses in Poor countries (equal to 1% of their 
population).  In scenario D Lower Middle income countries have stockpiles equal to 1% 
                                                          
40Although all regions in a particular income group receive the same stockpile, as a percent of their 
population, it is possible that the stockpile may be exhausted in some regions but not in others.  This 
complicates interpretation of a change in stockpile size across an income group, since such a change may 
lead to additional people being treated in some regions but not in others. 
41
 However, note that the entire 91.5 million doses are not always consumed, or are not always consumed 
within the first year, as some regions will not exhaust a stockpile equal to 10% of their population size.  
Since 1/3 of infectious cases are treated, a region will not exhaust a 10% stockpile any time its attack rate 
is less than 0.3. 
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of their populations and Indonesia has a stockpile of 9.2 million doses
42
, which equals 
4.2% of its population. 
ii) The value of antivirus 
 Treatment with antivirus is highly effective in reducing pandemic attack rates.  
Figure 5.1 shows the effect on the global attack rate from AV treatment under a range of 
scenarios where AV stockpiles are concentrated in wealthier countries.  The impact of 
each scenario on attack rates at the end of one year depends on the infectiousness of the 
flu (i.e., P(T|C)), the timing of the flu (whether the flu starts on January 1 or July 1) and 
the effectiveness of antivirals (e). 
 In all cases, there is a sizeable reduction in attack rate; recall that a reduction in 
global attack rate of 0.01 is equal to roughly 64 million fewer influenza cases by the end 
of the first year.  Larger stockpile sizes lead to lower attack rates.  Lower AV efficacy 
leads to a smaller reduction in attack rate.  A high P(T|C) value reduces the effectiveness 
of AV.  A low P(T|C) value means that the 1/1/5/10 scenario is able to contain the 
pandemic completely, because this scenario allocates AV to the outbreak source 
(Indonesia) and the low P(T|C) value implies that treatment in Indonesia is able to reduce 
the R0 value below 1, and prevent a pandemic.  But containment is not possible in other 
scenarios. 
 Figures 5.2-5.4  show the impact of varying these parameters on the cumulative 
number of influenza cases at the end of one year.  In the standard case (medium 
infectiousness, January 1 start date and reduction in infectiousness of 60%), Scenario A 
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 The 9.2 million doses are 1% of the Rich income group population, so Scenario D is the equivalent of 
Rich countries purchasing an additional 1% stockpile, but distributing it to Indonesia. 
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reduces the attack rate by 5.2 percentage points (334 million cases); scenario B reduces 
the attack rate by 13.6 percentage points (877 million cases) and scenario C reduces the 
attack rate by 19.3 percentage points (1,237 million cases), all relative to the no-AV 
baseline.  Scenario A leads to an average of 2.85 fewer cases per dose, 7.16 fewer cases 
per dose for Scenario B, and 8.60 fewer cases per dose for Scenario C. 
Increasing the infectious of the flu (P(T|C) = 0.06) reduces the effectiveness of 
AVs, while a lower value of P(T|C) makes containment of the flu possible under scenario 
C.  Scenario C allocates AV to all poor countries, including the outbreak source 
(Indonesia), and the low P(T|C) value implies that treatment in Indonesia is able to 
reduce the R0 value below 1, and prevent a pandemic.  But containment is not possible in 
other scenarios.  Reducing the effectiveness of the AV dose from e = 0.6 to e = 0.5 
reduces the number cases reduced per dose of AV from 2.85 to 2.55 in scenario A, from 






















A1 0/0/5/10 Low 1-Jan 0.6 0.287 0.235 0.052 
A2 0/0/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.6 0.446 0.394 0.052 
A3 0/0/5/10 Medium 1-Jul 0.6 0.547 0.456 0.091 
A4 0/0/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.5 0.446 0.400 0.047 
A5 0/0/5/10 High 1-Jan 0.6 0.533 0.480 0.053 
B1 0/1/5/10 Low 1-Jan 0.6 0.235 0.154 0.081 
B2 0/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.6 0.446 0.310 0.136 
B3 0/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jul 0.6 0.547 0.385 0.162 
B4 0/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.5 0.446 0.325 0.121 
B5 0/1/5/10 High 1-Jan 0.6 0.533 0.499 0.034 
C1 1/1/5/10 Low 1-Jan 0.6 0.235 0.000 0.234 
C2 1/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.6 0.446 0.254 0.193 
C3 1/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jul 0.6 0.547 0.301 0.246 
C4 1/1/5/10 Medium 1-Jan 0.5 0.446 0.309 0.137 
C5 1/1/5/10 High 1-Jan 0.6 0.533 0.461 0.072 
Note: "Standard" assumption scenarios are in bold.  AV stockpile sizes a/b/c/d refer to 
Poor/LowerMid/UpperMid/Rich regions. Low P(T|C) = 0.045, Medium P(T|C) = 
0.05333, High P(T|C) = 0.06. 
Figure 5.2: Reduction in global influenza cases from AV, sensitivity to virulence  






























(no AV) 0 0  0 0  0 0  
Scenario 
A 0.052 0.333 2.836 0.052 0.334 2.848 0.053 0.341 2.906 
Scenario 
B 0.132 0.850 6.946 0.136 0.877 7.163 0.034 0.219 1.793 
Scenario 
C 0.286 1.839 12.773 0.193 1.237 8.594 0.072 0.466 3.235 
Note: Change in attack rate and number of cases refer to the reduction relative to the no-
AV baseline (so a positive value indicates fewer people infected).  All figures are for the 




Figure 5.3: Reduction in global influenza cases from AV, sensitivity to start date 
 January 1 start July 1 start 













per AV dose 
Baseline 
(no AV) 0 0  0 0  
Scenario A 0.052 0.334 2.848 0.091 0.585 4.993 
Scenario B 0.136 0.877 7.163 0.162 1.041 8.508 
Scenario C 0.193 1.237 8.594 0.246 1.581 10.984 
Note: Change in attack rate and number of cases refer to the reduction relative to the no-
AV baseline (so a positive value indicates fewer people infected).  All figures are for the 
point 1 year after the pandemic commences. 
Figure 5.4: Reduction in global influenza cases from AV, sensitivity to AV efficacy 
 γ = 0.6  γ = 0.5 













per AV dose 
Baseline 
(no AV) 0 0  0 0  
Scenario A 0.052 0.334 2.848 0.047 0.299 2.550 
Scenario B 0.136 0.877 7.163 0.121 0.779 6.360 
Scenario C 0.193 1.237 8.594 0.137 0.879 6.104 
Note: Change in attack rate and number of cases refer to the reduction relative to the no-
AV baseline (so a positive value indicates fewer people infected).  All figures are for the 
point 1 year after the pandemic commences. 
 The impact of AV on attack rate is and is also affected by the start date of the 
pandemic, due to the seasonality assumptions.  Recall that infectiousness in non-tropical 
regions is highest in winter and lowest in summer.  This means that AV distribution, 
which slows the pandemic, will also have an indirect effect on infectiousness by changing 
the time of year during which the pandemic peak occurs.  As shown in Chapter 4, a 
pandemic that starts on January 1 peaks during northern hemisphere summer given a 
"medium" P(T|C), but peaks during northern hemisphere winter for a pandemic starting 
on July 1.  AV policies that slow the pandemic will tend to increase the average 
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seasonality factor for a Jan 1 start date, and decrease the average seasonality factor for a 
July start date, because most of the population lives in the northern hemisphere.  The net 
impact of an AV policy is a combination of both its direct effect from reducing 
infectiousness, and its indirect effect via the change in seasonality factor. 
 Figure 5.5 shows how AV treatment delays the pandemic (shifting the distribution 
rightwards).  With a January 1 start date, delay blunts the effectiveness of AV in reducing 
the attack rate, because it pushes the pandemic peak towards northern hemisphere winter.  
With a July 1 start date, delay augments the effectiveness of AV in reducing the attack 
rate, because it pushes the pandemic peak away from northern hemisphere winter. 



































Days since January 1








Note: Results are for a P(T|C) of 0.05333, and AV efficacy 0.6. 
 
iii) Antivirus, externalities and complementarities 
 In one and two-city SIR models, most of the gains from AV treatment accrued to 
the region in which the treatment was taken, but there were some positive spillover 
effects.  These results also hold in the full GEM.  Figure 5.6 shows the reduction in attack 
rates from AV treatment across income groups for the standard set of assumptions.  
Moving from no AV to the 0/0/5/10 scenario, there is a very large reduction in attack rate 
in Rich regions, a large attack rate reduction in Upper middle income regions, and 
negligible impacts in lower income regions
43
.  Moving to 0/1/5/10 adds a stockpile in 
lower middle income regions, which significantly reduces the attack rate there while 
causing a small but positive impact elsewhere.  Moving then to 1/1/5/10 adds an AV 
stockpile in poor countries, leading to a large attack rate reduction in poor countries and 
moderate benefits elsewhere.  
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 In fact, there is a very small increase in attack rate in Poor and Lower Middle income regions.  This is 
due to interaction with seasonality effects; AV in wealthier countries delays the pandemic slightly, which 
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Jan 1 start date, Medium P(T|C)  
 Baseline (no AV) 0.0 0.446 0.528 0.401 0.397 0.325 
Scenario A 117.3 0.394 0.529 0.403 0.210 0.059 
Scenario B 138.8 0.310 0.525 0.169 0.166 0.052 
Scenario C 167.2 0.254 0.458 0.121 0.051 0.045 
Jan 1 start date, Low P(T|C)  
 Baseline (no AV) 0.0 0.287 0.353 0.226 0.285 0.225 
Scenario A 117.3 0.235 0.351 0.223 0.010 0.027 
Scenario B 138.8 0.154 0.343 0.003 0.003 0.010 
Scenario C 167.2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jan 1 start date, High P(T|C)  
 Baseline (no AV) 0.0 0.533 0.631 0.492 0.473 0.362 
Scenario A 117.3 0.480 0.630 0.487 0.299 0.102 
Scenario B 138.8 0.499 0.627 0.547 0.299 0.102 
Scenario C 167.2 0.461 0.606 0.458 0.302 0.108 
July 1 start date, Medium 
P(T|C)  
 Baseline (no AV) 0.0 0.547 0.546 0.536 0.617 0.538 
Scenario A 117.3 0.456 0.544 0.532 0.268 0.110 
Scenario B 138.8 0.358 0.542 0.331 0.249 0.102 
Scenario C 167.2 0.301 0.484 0.183 0.183 0.077 
Note: Results are for a January 1 start date, and AV efficacy 0.6 
The small external benefits to Rich countries of Lower Middle and Poor countries 
having stockpiles still holds when the flu starts on July 1, assuming it is moderately 
transmissible.  A highly transmissible flu, however, sharply reduces the benefits to Rich 
countries of stockpiles in Lower Middle income and Poor countries, because a small 
stockpile is rapidly exhausted under a virus with a high reproductive rate.  Indeed, in the 
January 1, High Transmissibility case Rich countries are slightly worse off in Scenario C 
compared to Scenario B.  This effect is driven by seasonality; in the high transmissibility 
scenario, AV in poor countries is ineffective in reducing attack rates by the slight delay it 
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causes pushes the pandemic peak in the northern hemisphere towards winter.  The fact 
that Lower Middle income countries themselves are worse off when using AVs (118 
million additional cases relative to no treatment) in the High transmissibility scenario 
with the January 1 start date follows largely from a higher attack rate in China, where the 
slight delay from a 1% stockpile pushes the pandemic peak towards winter (and so 
increases China's average seasonality factor).   
 It seems likely that in reality poor and lower middle income countries will not 
purchase and maintain their own stockpiles of antivirus, for use in the course of a 
pandemic.  But the external benefits to rich countries suggest that there may be scope for 
a pareto-improvement; rich countries may find it in their interest to pay the costs of 
acquiring and distributing antivirals in poor countries.  As discussed more fully below, 
Table 5.7 implies that the reduction in number of influenza cases in rich countries per AV 
dose administered in poor or lower middle income countries is 1/3 or more when the 
transmissibility of the flu is low to moderate.    
 An alternative possibility is for rich countries to donate AV directly to the 
outbreak source.  Consider a scenario where rich countries collectively provide AV doses 
equal to 1% of their population directly to Indonesia.  Figure 5.7 shows the effect of this 
policy when combined with a 0/1/5/10 scenario.  In nearly every case, the donation policy 
reduces the global attack rate and the attack rate in rich countries.  In a few cases attack 
rates are increased, due to the seasonality effect with the January 1 start date, where 
slowing the pandemic spread increases the average seasonality factor in the northern 
hemisphere.  The gain from donation is largest in the Low P(T|C) scenarios, because in 
these cases donation to the outbreak source reduces the R0 below 1 and the pandemic is 
89 
 
contained.  the gains are also large in the July 1 start date scenario, where delay is more 
valuable due to the seasonality interaction.  The external benefits of providing AV are 
lower when the AV efficacy is lower, which contributes to the negative impact of 
donation in the low AV efficacy scenario. 















Low 1-Jan 0.6 World 0.178 0.001 0.176 
Low 1-Jan 0.6 Rich 0.015 0.001 0.014 
Medium 1-Jan 0.6 World 0.310 0.289 0.021 
Medium 1-Jan 0.6 Rich 0.052 0.047 0.005 
Medium 1-Jan 0.5 World 0.310 0.319 -0.009 
Medium 1-Jan 0.5 Rich 0.052 0.068 -0.016 
Medium 1-Jul 0.6 World 0.450 0.328 0.122 
Medium 1-Jul 0.6 Rich 0.111 0.081 0.031 
High 1-Jan 0.6 World 0.489 0.468 0.021 
High 1-Jan 0.6 Rich 0.103 0.108 -0.005 
 
 Which strategy is more effective for rich countries, paying for AV doses to be 
spread amongst poor countries in general, or paying for AV doses to be targeted to the 
outbreak source?  Under what circumstances will welfare in rich countries be increased 
by undertaking this strategy?  Figure 5.8 compares the effectiveness of purchasing doses 
for low income countries in general to the effectiveness of purchasing doses for the 
outbreak source country.  Neither strategy is effective in reducing the number of cases in 
rich countries for a high virulence pandemic (P(T|C) = 0.06).  But in all other cases, 
targeting the outbreak source is dramatically more cost effective than spreading doses 








Rich country cases reduced 
per extra AV dose 
purchased 
Scenario A1 → B1 Low 
1-
Jan 0.74 
Scenario A2 → B2 Medium 
1-
Jan 0.31 
Scenario A3 → B3 Medium 1-Jul 0.33 
Scenario A4 → B4 High 
1-
Jan 0.00 
Scenario B1 → C1 Low 
1-
Jan 0.29 
Scenario B2 → C2 Medium 
1-
Jan 0.22 
Scenario B3 → C3 Medium 1-Jul 0.83 
Scenario B4 → C4 High 
1-
Jan -0.17 
Scenario B1 → D1 Low 
1-
Jan 1.42 
Scenario B2 → D2 Medium 
1-
Jan 0.52 
Scenario B3 → D3 Medium 1-Jul 3.06 
Scenario B4 → D4 High 
1-
Jan -0.51 
Note: AV efficacy is 0.6 in all cases. 
 Figure 5.8 suggests that providing AVs to developing countries in the event of a 
pandemic may pass a benefit-cost test.  Although the percentage reduction in cases from 
providing AVs is small, millions of cases of the flu in rich countries would thereby be 
avoided, at a cost of 3-4 doses of antivirals per case avoided.  Even at a cost of $25-$30 
per course of treatment (including distribution costs), this would likely pass a benefit-cost 
test, even without any fatalities.
44
  Sander et al. (2009) predict the economic cost of an 
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 Evidence on costs of AV is difficult to come by.  Lokuge et al. (2006) report average stockpile acquisition 
costs per course for the USA, UK, Australia and Canada of $17-$50.  Sander et al. (2009) assume a 20% 
markup to cover distribution costs.  It is also unclear which costs should be considered; from a particular 
country's perspective we may wish to consider wholesale prices, but from a global welfare perspective we 
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influenza epidemic in the U.S. at $187 per person, based on a 50% attack rate.  Keogh-
Brown et al. (2010) suggest that a mild influenza pandemic in the UK (similar to the 
1957 or 1968 pandemics) would reduce GDP by 0.58% over the course of year; a more 
severe pandemic (with a case fatality rate of 1%) would reduce GDP by 4.5% over the 
course of a year.  Typical estimates of the value of a statistical life in rich countries are in 
the millions of dollars, and so even a very low but positive case fatality rate would lead to 
a large value from reducing cases. 
v) The value of health infrastructure 
 The effectiveness of using AV to mitigate pandemics is a function of the 
effectiveness of the public health system infrastructure in each country, and its ability to 
rapidly and accurately identify infectious individuals and provide them with AV 
treatment.  In the primary simulation runs, it is assumed that 50% of symptomatic cases 
(and thus 33.35% of infectious cases, since 33.3% of cases are asymptomatic) could be 
reached a single day after symptoms presented, in any country that had a stockpile.  
These assumptions are arguably too optimistic, particularly for developing countries, 
though they are more pessimistic than the assumptions used in some other global 
influenza papers
45
.  By weakening these assumptions and reducing the proportion of 
symptomatic infectious cases who receive treatment, I can examine the sensitivity to 
these assumptions – and investigate the value of strengthening public health systems in 
poor countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
should be concerned only with pure manufacturing and distribution costs, as the wholesale markup is a 
welfare transfer to drug manufacturers rather than a cost. 
45
 For example Colizza et al. (2007) assume that 30, 50, or 70% of new infectious cases, can be treated. 
92 
 
Consider a weak health infrastructure scenario (Figure 5.9), where only 30% of 
symptomatic infectious cases can be treated in poor and lower middle income countries, 
40% in upper middle income countries, and (as before) 50% in rich countries. 
 Figure 5.9 presents simulations based on a weak health infrastructure scenario in 
which only 30% of symptomatic infectious cases can be treated in poor and lower middle 
income countries, 40% in upper middle income countries, and (as before) 50% in rich 
countries. The effect of reducing the proportion who are treated is dramatic, both on the 
direct value of antiviral treatment in countries that have a stockpile, and on the external 
benefits to rich countries from providing antiviral doses to poorer countries.  In terms of 
direct effects, the marginal benefit (in terms of world cases reduced) from an AV 
stockpile in upper middle and rich countries is reduced from 5.2 percentage points to 4.8 
percentage points.  The marginal benefit from adding a 1% stockpile to lower middle 
income countries is reduced from 8.4 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points.  The 
marginal benefit from adding a 1% stockpile to poor countries is reduced from 5.6 




Figure 5.9: Attack rate after 1 year, standard vs. reduced proportion of infectious 









AV) 0.446 0.446 
 
Scenario A 0.394 0.398 
 
Scenario B 0.310 0.373 
 
Scenario C 0.254 0.360 
Poor 
Baseline (no 
AV) 0.528 0.528 
 
Scenario A 0.529 0.529 
 
Scenario B 0.525 0.525 
 




AV) 0.401 0.401 
 
Scenario A 0.403 0.403 
 
Scenario B 0.169 0.336 
 
Scenario C 0.121 0.314 
Upper middle 
Baseline (no 
AV) 0.397 0.397 
 
Scenario A 0.210 0.254 
 
Scenario B 0.166 0.248 
 
Scenario C 0.051 0.224 
Rich 
Baseline (no 
AV) 0.325 0.325 
 
Scenario A 0.059 0.061 
 
Scenario B 0.052 0.058 
 
Scenario C 0.045 0.055 
Note: Strong health infrastructure means 50% of new symptomatic infectious cases are 
treated (in regions that have an AV stockpile); weak health infrastructure means that 
30% of cases are treated in poor and lower middle income regions, 40% in upper middle 





 The effect of reducing the proportion who are treated is dramatic, both on the 
direct value of antiviral treatment in countries that have a stockpile, and on the external 
benefits to rich countries from providing antiviral doses to poorer countries.  In terms of 
direct effects, the marginal benefit (in terms of world cases reduced) from an AV 
stockpile in upper middle and rich countries is reduced from 5.2 percentage points to 4.8 
percentage points.  The marginal benefit from adding a 1% stockpile to lower middle 
income countries is reduced from 8.4 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points.  The 
marginal benefit from adding a 1% stockpile to poor countries is reduced from 5.6 
percentage points to 1.3 percentage points.  The indirect effects are also significant.  The 
marginal reduction in the attack rate in rich countries from adding a 1% stockpile for 
lower middle income countries falls from 0.7 percentage points to 0.3 percentage points.  
Similarly for adding a 1% stockpile to poor countries, the benefit falls from 0.7 to 0.3.  
These results follow from the basic "increasing returns" property of the core SIR model; 
with a lower percentage of people treated, the effect of AV on reducing the reproductive 
rate is diminished proportionally, which has a greater than proportional impact on the 
benefits of AV from reducing attack rtes. 
 These results suggest that if the "Reduced" proportion treated parameters are a 
more accurate description of the real world, then investments that increase the number of 
infectious people than can be treated in poorer countries will have large benefits, and will 




Figure 5.10: Rich country cases reduced per AV dose purchased in poor countries, 
sensitivity to weak health infrastructure 
Scenario Transition: P(T|C) 
Start 
date 
Rich country cases reduced per 
extra AV dose purchased 

















Note: "4.2 in Indonesia" refers to the fact that the 9.14 million doses donated to 
Indonesia constitute 4.2% of Indonesia's population.  AV efficacy is 0.6 in all cases.  
"Strong health infrastructure" means 50% of symptomatic infectious cases are treated in 
all income groups.  "Weak health infrastructure" means 30% of symptomatic infectious 
cases are treated in Poor and Lower middle income group regions, 40% in Upper middle 
income group regions, and 50% in Rich regions. 
 
vi) Allocating antivirals across countries 
 Discussions of global public health are often motivated by different perspectives 
on altruism and global fairness, as much as economic efficiency.  But what are the 
epidemiological consequences of different views of fairness?  Suppose that a global 
agency such as the World Health Organization was able to purchase a stockpile and 
distribute it over the course of a pandemic.  If it did so, how should the agency distribute 
doses so as to maximize the number of cases prevented?  Consider two extreme 
allocation rules that might be adopted under different conceptions of global fairness.  One 
allocation would be to simply have a single global stockpile, that uses doses to treat 
infectious cases as they develop symptoms, no matter where in the world they are.  This 
"patient-oriented" rule could be viewed as fair under a perspective that sees people as 
having an equal right to treatment.  A second possibility is to evenly divide up the 
stockpile among regions in proportion to population size, so each region uses its share of 
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the stockpile to treat only its own citizens.  This "nation-oriented" rule could be seen as 
fair under a moral view that each country has equal right to access to treatment, 
regardless of the whether the pandemic reaches them quickly or slowly. 
 What are the implications of these allocation rules?  Consider each allocation rule 
for a global stockpile size equal to 1% or 2% of the world population (roughly 64 million 
doses or 128 million doses, respectively).  The main practical differences between the 
allocation rules are the speed at which they disburse doses and the number of doses 
allocated to each country.  Doses are disbursed faster in the early stage of the pandemic 
under the ―patient-oriented‖ rule than under the ―nation-oriented‖ rule, because people in 
regions that suffer many cases early on keep treating patients even after they would have 
consumed a stockpile equal to 1% or 2% of their population size.  However, this also 
means that the global stockpile is exhausted more rapidly under the ―patient-oriented‖ 
rule, and so this rule effectively transfers doses from countries where the pandemic is late 
to arrive to countries where the pandemic is early to arrive. 
 Figure 5.11 compares global attack rates across the two rules for the standard 
assumptions (P(T|C) = 0.05333, Jan 1 start date), the severe pandemic (P(T|C) = 0.06), 




Figure 5.11:  World attack rates under varying allocation rules 
 












Standard 0.446 0.389 0.281 0.037 0.152 
High P(T|C) 0.533 0.589 0.509 0.601 0.409 
Low P(T|C) 0.287 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
July 1 start date 0.547 0.412 0.369 0.210 0.227 
 
 In the ―Low‖ scenario, the pandemic is contained because AV doses are provided 
to the outbreak source under both rules, and this is sufficient to push the R0 below 1.  In 
most other cases, the nation-oriented rule performs better (ie leads to a lower attack rate 
after 1 year) than the patient-oriented rule.  The reason for this is straightforward; under a 
patient-oriented rule, doses continue to be allocated to the outbreak country even after the 
pandemic has spread beyond the outbreak country.  Those additional doses in the 
outbreak country have a negligible impact on the rest of the world, but they exhaust the 
stockpile rapidly, so there are many fewer doses to be used in other countries, and the 
number of global cases increases sharply as the global stockpile expires. 
 The patient-oriented method appears to give a better result for the standard case 
with the 2% stockpile, but this is highly sensitive to the 1-year cutoff date.  Figure 5.12 
demonstrates the impact of the 1-year cutoff under the two rules.  The 1% stockpile is 
exhausted after 280 days under the patient-based rule.  The 2% stockpile is not exhausted 
until day 370, which makes it superior for reducing the attack rate after 1 year, but once 
the stockpile is exhausted the pandemic spreads very rapidly, and beyond day 455 the 
attack rate is higher under the patient-based rule than under the nation-based rule. 
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 The optimal policy depends on how long it will take to develop, manufacture, 
distribute, and administer an effective vaccine, and on the size of the stockpile (relative to 
the pandemic reproductive rate.  If the global stockpile is large, then the rapid 
disbursement property of the patient-oriented method makes it superior; when exhaustion 
of the stockpile is less of a risk, then the faster disbursement rate is valuable.  Fast 









































































vaccine is available) is short – for example, the attack rate after 9 months is lower under 
the patient-oriented rule for both 1% or 2% global stockpiles.  But if the global stockpile 
is small or the relevant time horizon is longer, then the nation-oriented method is more 
desirable, because it ensures that limited AV uses are used to treat the early cases in 
every country.  This is more effective in slowing the pandemic spread and reducing the 
one-year attack rate than continue to spend doses on new cases in the outbreak country 





Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 Treating infectious individuals with antiviral drugs may be an effective method 
for mitigating the consequences of an influenza pandemic. While most of the benefits 
from a country choosing to treat its population with antivirals will accrue to that country, 
there are some positive externalities.  This implies that, in a world in which poor 
countries are unlikely to hold stockpiles of antiviral drugs, it may be in the self-interest of 
wealthy countries to (collectively) pay for purchase and distribute antivirals to poor 
countries, even without any altruistic or humanitarian motivations. 
 The payoff to providing antiviral doses to poor countries is illustrated by a simple, 
two-country SIR model.  In that model there are significant externalities and 
complementarities in antiviral treatment: when one country treats more of its population 
this both reduces the attack rate in the other country and increases the marginal benefit 
from additional treatment in the other country.   
 It would, however, be misleading to draw policy conclusions from a simple two-
country model.  In reality, influenza spreads through a complex network of air- and land-
based travel.  The spread of the flu and the effectiveness of treatment policies depend on 
seasonal factors—e.g., whether the flu peaks in Northern Hemisphere winter or Northern 
Hemisphere summer.  And, the number and distribution of poor v. rich countries differs 
significantly from the symmetric two-region SIR model.  The spread of the flu is 
simulated in a more descriptively realistic global epidemiological model in order to 
capture the impact of these features on the effectiveness of treatment policies.   
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 Under the base case assumptions of moderate transmissibility of the flu, the 
distribution of antiviral stockpiles from rich countries to poor and lower middle income 
countries may indeed pay for itself: providing a stockpile equal to 1% of the population 
of poor countries will reduce cases in rich countries after 1 year by about 6.13 million 
cases at a cost of 4.62 doses per rich-country case avoided.  Concentrating doses on the 
outbreak country is, however, even more cost-effective: in the base case it reduces the 
number of influenza cases by 4.76 million cases, at the cost of roughly 1.92 doses per 
case avoided.  
 These results are, however, dependent on the transmissibility of the flu, its 
effectiveness in reducing infection and on the proportion of infectious who can 
realistically be identified and treated.  Simulations reveal that reducing the proportion of 
symptomatic infectious that can be treated from 50% (our base case assumption) to 40% 
in lower middle income countries and 30% in poor countries more than doubles the 
number of doses required to reduce a case of the flu in rich countries. Providing 
stockpiles to poor countries may still pass the ―selfish‖ benefit-cost test.  But the results 
suggest that improving the delivery of health services in poor countries will complement 
policies to treat pandemic flu, in addition to yielding other health benefits.  
 These results also focus on the use of antivirals alone.  In practice, a variety of 
interventions may be adopted, including non-strain specific vaccination or non-
pharmaceutical interventions such as face masks and gloves or school or workplace 
closures.  These policies will tend to complement antiviral treatment, and should not be 
ignored when considering pandemic mitigation. 
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Appendix 1: One and Two-City SIR 
models reframed 
 Chapter 3 considered one and two city SIR models with antiviral policy 
interventions where the choice variable was the stockpile size.  While this 
characterization is useful in providing background and intuition for the policy 
interventions applied in the full Global Epidemiological Model, it is difficult to 
characterize in an analytic fashion.  An alternative characterization that is easier to 
analyze is to instead consider a model where the choice variable is the proportion of 
infectious cases who receive treatment p, and to assume that the planner has perfectly 
information and so purchases exactly enough doses to treat proportion p of infectious 
cases for the duration of the epidemic.  Hence, there is no concept of a "stockpile" that 
can be exhausted, and the effect of applying antivirus is merely to reduce the effective 
reproductive rate for the full epidemic duration.  The advantage of this characterization 
model is that the terminal values S(∞) and R(∞) can be observed from the transcendental 
equation, and so there is no need to run a simulation model. 
 The equations of motion for S(t), I(t) and R(t) remain unchanged from equations 
(7) through (9), but now rather than choosing a stockpile size P* a city chooses a 
proportion of people to treat         , where p* is the maximum possible proportion of 
infectious cases that can be treated, determined by the level of health infrastructure.  This 
means that the effective beta for the full duration of the pandemic is β = (1 - pe)β
o
, and 
the number of people treated is p[1-S( )]N.  A city chooses p to maximize: 




where S(∞,p) is defined by the transcendental equation ln(S( )) = R0(S( )-1),where R0 = 
β
o
(1-pe)/δ.   
For values of R0 that characterize pandemic flu, the p that maximizes equation 
F(p) is a corner solution: either p=0 or p=1.  First-order conditions to the maximization 
problem call for p to be chosen to the point where the marginal benefits of increasing 
S( ) both in terms of reducing the number never infected and the number of doses 
needed to treat the infectious, equal or exceed the cost of an additional dose, 
 dF(p)/dp = (V + cp)[dS( )/dp] – c[1- S( )] ≥ 0 (A2) 




 < 0, are, however, not 
satisfied for pandemic flu.
46
  Equation (6) implies that the proportion of people never 
infected, S( ), increases as R0 falls (i.e., as p is increased); however, for values of R0  > 
1.05, increasing p increases S( ) at an increasing rate.
47
  Influenza pandemics have 
generally been characterized by reproductive rates greater than 1.5.
48
  This implies that p 
= 0 maximizes (5) if V is low relative to c, but p = 1 maximizes (5) if V is high relative to 
c. To illustrate, when β° = 0.3, δ = 0.2 and e = 0.2, setting p = 1 is optimal if V/c > 1.2.
49
  










] + c[dS( )/dp] which need not be negative. 
47




















[dS( )/dR0] [2 + S( )
-2
[dS( )/dR0]]. 




 > 0 provided 2 + S( )
-2
[dS( )/dR0] < 0. Equation (6) implies that this 
condition is satisfied if R0 > 1.05. 
48
 The R0 for the 1957 Asian flu has been estimated at 1.8 (Vynnycky and Edmunds 2008). Vynnycky et al. 
(2007) estimate an R0 of 2.4-4.3 for the 1918 Spanish flu. 
49
 If we considered the case where e = 0.4 then p = 1 would nearly always be optimal, because p = 1 and e 
= 0.4 imply R0
eff
 = 0.9, and so no pandemic occurs. 
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 This model with choice variable p can be expanded to the two-city case in a 
similar fashion to the stockpile size model.  The qualitative results are similar, and are 
dependent on the particular parameter values.  Appendix table 1 demonstrates the attack 
rates that result from this model for various input parameters.   
Three points about Appendix Table 1 deserve emphasis: (1) when only one city 
treats its infectious, the effectiveness of its treatment is less than in the one-city case 
where there is no travel; (2) when only one city treats its infectious, the external benefits 
to the no-treatment city are small;   (3) when both cities treat, the effectiveness of each 
city’s stockpile is greater than when only one city employs a treatment strategy.  When 
city A treats 60% of its infectious in isolation, the attack rate is reduced from 58% to 
24%.  In the two-city case, the attack rate is reduced from 59% to 30%.  People from city 
B continue to re-infect city A, making city A’s treatment of its infectious less effective.  
The benefits to city B of A’s stockpile are, however, small: when city B has no stockpile, 
its attack rate is reduced by only 1.6 percentage points by virtue of the fact that A treats 
its infectious.  When both cities treat their infectious, the benefits to both cities increase, 
compared to the case in which each city acts in isolation.  When both cities treat, the 
attack rate is reduced from about 58% to 24% in each city, as in the single city case.  (In 
effect, the two cities have become a single city, employing the same treatment as in the 
single-city case.) 
 The magnitude of the externalities and complementarities observed in Appendix 
Table 1 are affected by the transmissibility of the flu (β
0
/δ), the proportion of infectious 
who can be treated (p*) and by the effectiveness of treatment (e).  The benefits to the no-
treatment city of antivirals in the treatment city are greater the less transmissible is the 
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flu, as are the complementarities of treatment (see Table 1). Treatment complementarities 
are also greater the higher the proportion of infectious who can be treated (p*) and the 
greater the efficacy of treatment (the higher is e).   
 With appropriate choice of V and c, it is possible to generate results where the 
Nash equilibrium is (pA = 0,  pB = p*) while the socially optimal solution is (pA = p*,  pB 
= p*) and yet there exists a pareto improvement where city B is made better off by paying 
for the costs of increasing pA from zero to p*.  For example, consider the case when VA = 
3, VB = 100 and c = 10.  The Nash equilibrium is pA= 0, pB = 0.6, whereas the treatment 
strategy that maximizes the sum of cases avoided minus treatment costs for the two cities 
combined is pA = pB = 0.6.  It is also the case that it pays city B to pay for antivirals 
sufficient to treat 60% of infectious in city A.  The cost of the treatment 







Appendix Table 1: Results from 2-city model with proportion treated as choice 
variable 
β° e α pA pB Attack rate in City 
A 
Attack rate in City 
B 
0.3 0.4 0.01 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.6 0 0.301 0.563 
   0 0.6 0.565 0.296 
   0.6 0.6 0.240 0.235 
0.35 0.4 0.01 0 0 0.719 0.707 
   0.6 0 0.475 0.705 
   0 0.6 0.709 0.468 
   0.6 0.6 0.456 0.449 
0.25 0.4 0.01 0 0 0.376 0.370 
   0.6 0 0.111 0.326 
   0 0.6 0.329 0.107 
   0.6 0.6 0.012 0.005 
0.3 0.3 0.01 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.6 0 0.381 0.569 
   0 0.6 0.573 0.376 
   0.6 0.6 0.353 0.348 
0.3 0.5 0.01 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.6 0 0.224 0.555 
   0 0.6 0.557 0.220 
   0.6 0.6 0.090 0.083 
0.3 0.4 0.01 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.7 0 0.249 0.558 
   0 0.7 0.559 0.244 
   0.7 0.7 0.145 0.138 
0.3 0.4 0.01 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.5 0 0.355 0.567 
   0 0.5 0.570 0.349 
   0.5 0.5 0.318 0.313 
0.3 0.5 0.015 0 0 0.587 0.580 
   0.6 0 0.318 0.555 
   0 0.6 0.557 0.314 
   0.6 0.6 0.239 0.235 
0.25 0.5 0.005 0 0 0.588 0.579 
   0.6 0 0.278 0.572 
   0 0.6 0.574 0.271 
   0.6 0.6 0.240 0.234 
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Appendix 2: List of Regions in the GEM, 
by Income Group 
Regions in the Poor Income Group: 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest 
of Central Africa, Rest of East Asia, Rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of Former Soviet 
Union, Rest of Oceania, Rest of South African Customs Union, Rest of South America, 
Rest of South Asia, Rest of South-Central Africa, Rest of Southeast Asia, Rest of 
Western Africa,  
Regions in the Lower Middle Income Group: 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Peru, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, Rest of Central America, Rest of Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Rest 
of North Africa, Rest of Western Asia 
Regions in the Upper Middle Income Group: 
Chile, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Republic of Korea, 
Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rest of the 
Caribbean 
Regions in the Rich Income Group: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong S.A.R. of China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel and 
Arabia, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Rest of EFTA, Rest of North America 
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Appendix 3: Deriving the daily infectious 
contact rate 
 This appendix describes the derivation of the matrix of contact rates, and hence 
the daily infectious contact rates λ.  The goal is to derive contact rates for each age-group 
in each city based on real world data from Europe, and attempt to adjust the European 
data to fit other cities by accounting for differences in age structure and density. 
 First define the 4x4 contact rate matrix Ci.  The elements Cijk describe the number 
of contacts per day that an Infectious person of age-group j has per day with individuals 
in age-group k in city i.  Following Hethcote and Yorke (1984) and Over and Piot (1993), 
decompose this matrix into two parts: a 4x4 mixing matrix Mi and a 4x1 contact vector 
Ai, such that : 
             (A3) 
where I4 is the 4x4 identity matrix. 
 The vector Ai gives the absolute number of contacts per day for each agegroup; so 
for example AJakarta' = [7.29, 9.45, 6.41, 3.98] means that in Jakarta, each Infectious case 
with a=0 has 7.29 contacts per day, each Infectious case with a=1 has 9.45 contacts per 
day, and so forth.  Denote the 4x1 vector ni as the proportion of the population that are of 
each age category, so the elements of ni sum to 1.  The total number of contacts per 
person per day in city i is then the product ni'Ai.  For example, in Indonesia, 9.64% of the 
population are age0, 18.75% are age1, 66.09% are age2 and 5.52% are age3, so the total 
contacts per day is the product nJakarta'AJakarta = 6.94.  
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 The mixing matrix Mi describes the relative mixing rates between age-groups. 
Each row of the M matrix sums to 1, so the element Mijk describes the proportion of an 
individual of age-group j's contacts that they have with age-group k.  For example, if the 
jth row of Mi were [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] then age-group j individuals in city i would 
contact equal numbers of all four age-groups each day.   
 C, M and A have subscripts i because these vary across cities, though all cities 
within a region are assumed to have the same values of C, M, A and n.  Values for A and 
M are generated based on mixing data from Mossong et al. (2008) and from data on 
population density and urbanization rates.  Mossong et al. measure self-reported physical 
contact rate matrices for eight European countries for ten age categories from self-
reported contacts across 7,290 individuals.
 50
  Their data provides the equivalent of a C-
matrix for each of the 8 countries.  The goal is to use these to extract an underlying set of 
"core behavior" that can be assumed to hold in all countries, and will allow 
reconstruction of a C-matrix for every region in the GEM. 
 The Mossong data is used directly to estimate the absolute number of contacts in 
each city, and the relative mixing rates of one age-group with another.  A-vectors are 
defined for each region such that n’A = 6.94 in every region – where 6.94 is the 




                                                          
50
 Belgium, Germany, Finland, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Poland. 
51
 This crucial assumption, made for simplicity, implies that there is no variation in total contacts per day 
by age-structure; it will not be the case that the pandemic spreads faster in countries with younger 
populations merely because young people have higher contact rates.  An alternative structure that would 
have this property could be generated by fixing the individual elements A i across countries, but that 
would lead to very large variation in contact rates (and thus attack rates) across countries. 
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 But I cannot simply work directly with the C or M matrices from the Mossong 
data; the C and M matrices are in part a product of the particular age structure of the 
country they are observed in, and age-structures vary across countries.  For example, 
consider the hypothetical example above, where the jth row of Mi = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 
0.25], and suppose that all 4 age-groups in city i are of equal size (ie ni' = 
[0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]).  This represents fully random mixing, every person has an equal 
probability of contacting any other person, regardless of age-category.  Now, consider 
some other city y with the same underlying behavior (fully random mixing), but with a 
younger population; suppose ny' = [0.35, 0.25, 0.25, 0.15].  Clearly, it cannot be the case 
that the jth row of My =[0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], because that would imply that a person of 
age j was contacting the same number age1 and age4 people in both cities, despite the 
fact that there are many fewer age3 people available to contact in city y and many more 
age1 people.  So the confounding effect of the relative age-group sizes needs to be 
separated out. 
 An M matrix for each region by is estimated by assuming a structural form for the 
matrix, and then using the 8 Mossong matrices to estimate an underlying mixing matrix 
stripped of the country-specific n-vectors.  Following Hethcote and Yorke, define a 4x1 
vector Bi: 
 
    
      
       
 
   
 
(A4) 
And a 4x4 matrix G and G whose elements are defined by: 
                  (A5) 
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where Gijk is the (j,k) element of the B matrix for city i, and similarly for M.  Bij is the jth 
element of the B-vector in city i, and can be interpreted as the proportion of contacts that 
would be with age-group j city i under random mixing.  The G-matrix is what allows us 
to move away from random mixing, and captures the more complex structure where 
people can have differential mixing rates across age-groups. 
 Assume a structural form for the G-matrix where Gijk = Gij, i.e. all elements of the 
same row have the same value.
52
  That is, each age-group is assumed to have the same 
relative preference for mixing with its own age-group as for all other age-groups.  
Estimate the G-matrix that minimizes the sum of squared residuals across the 8 Mossong 
countries to find an ―optimal‖ G-matrix G*.  M, and hence C matrices, for every region 
in the model are then reconstructed by substituting G* and the region-specific age 
structures from real world population data into the equations above. 
 Contact rates are adjusted by adding a semi-arbitrary adjustment for population 
density, recognizing that areas with higher population density have higher contact rates.  
Define the ―residual urbanization rate‖ of a region as the urbanization rate of the ―rural‖ 
population that is not a member of the 289 cities explicitly included included in the 
model.  For example, Indonesia has an urbanization rate of 48.1%, but when the 
populations of Bandung, Denpasar, Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya (the Indonesian cities in 
the model) are excluded, the residual urbanization rate is 41.5%. 
 Every city and rural area is assigned to one of four categories, each with a relative 
density factor di; d = 1 for rural areas with residual urbanization <40%, d=1.1 for rural 
                                                          
52
 Tested alternative forms showed that moving from a 16-unique-element G-matrix to a 4-unique 
element G-matrix had very little impact on the fit to the Mossong data, but that moving from a 4-element 
G-matrix to a 1-element G-matrix significantly worsened the fit. 
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areas with residual urbanization >40%, d = 1.3 for low density urban areas (cities with 
density < 1,000 people per square kilometer), and d = 1.4 for urban area low density (for 
cities with density > 1,000 per square kilometer).  In general, ―rural‖ areas in high income 
countries have high residual urbanization while those in low income countries have low 
residual urbanization, and cities in high income countries have low population densities 
while those in low income countries have high population densities. 
 Finally, the daily infectious contact rate is λ given by: 
 
             
 
   
        
(A6) 
where the values of the C-matrix for each city are derived from the Mossong data as 
described above.  This leaves us with the infectious contact rate dependent on one free 
parameter input (the probability of transmission given contact), which can then be varied 
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